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INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION:
A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR ADDRESSING
§ 101 PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
KRISTEN OSENGA*
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is a mess, and it is weakening
patent rights in this country. Nearly everyone, from the bar to the bench and
from academia to industry, has called for reform. Multiple proposals to amend
35 U.S.C. § 101 have been drafted, each aimed at trying to make the doctrine
more workable. Although offered with the best intentions, the proposals to fix
patent-eligible subject matter are doomed to fail because none of the proposals
address which institution is best suited to determine patent eligibility.
This Article takes a different, and perhaps radical, tactic. Specifically,
patent-eligible subject matter inquiries should be vested solely in the courts. The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) should not consider patent
eligibility of patent applications or issued patents. Although this solution seems
incongruous, in looking at the particular institutional competencies of the courts
versus the various components of the Patent Office, it becomes clear that if the
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is to be fixed, the courts are in the best
position to do so. In addition to being particularly suited to determine patent
eligibility, vesting these decisions in the courts should result in a more workable
and certain test for patent eligibility, which in turn should strengthen patent
rights and enhance innovation.

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law; Senior Scholar, Center
for the Protection of Intellectual Property. Special thanks to the staff of the American
University Law Review, as well as Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, and Corinna Lain for
helpful comments. The research and writing of this Article was supported by the
Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property at Antonin Scalia Law School,
George Mason University. All opinions and errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States—the land of innovation—has an innovation
problem. Two reports recently published announced that the country
has fallen from its previous position as a leader in innovation. One report,
the 2018 Bloomberg Innovation Index, stated that the United States
dropped out of the top ten innovative countries for the first time in the
six-year history of the index.1 The other report, the United States
Chamber of Commerce’s Global IP Index for 2018, stated that the
country remained atop the list generally but fell significantly with respect
to patent protection.2 In fact, in the Chamber’s index, the United States
dropped completely out of the top ten with respect to countries offering
strong patent protection to innovators, falling to a tie for twelfth with
Italy.3 Additional reports indicate innovative firms are leaving the United
States and shifting their operations overseas to Europe and China.4
What is behind the collapse of the United States as an innovation
leader? In part, it is due to the erosion of effective and reliable patent
protection available to inventors and innovators.5 There is a strong
correlation between effective patent rights and growing innovation

1. Michelle Jamrisko & Wei Lu, The U.S. Drops out of the Top 10 in Innovation
Ranking, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2018-01-22/south-korea-tops-global-innovation-ranking-again-as-u-s-falls.
2. U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., GLOBAL INNOVATION POL’Y CTR., CREATE: U.S.
CHAMBER INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX 6, 35–36, 156–57 (6th ed. 2018),
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_
2018.pdf [hereinafter CREATE].
3. Id. at 35.
4. See Ryan Davis, Experts Look to Congress to Stem Patent-Eligibility ‘Chaos,’ LAW360
(Apr. 20, 2018, 7:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1035947.
5. Strength of patent protection (or lack thereof) is directly implicated in the
Chamber’s index. See CREATE, supra note 2, at 156; see also Chris Coons, A Few
Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Section 101 Jurisprudence, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 8, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/08/thoughts-supreme-courts-section-101jurisprudence (noting that the erosion of patent protection, caused in part by the state
of patent-eligible subject matter, has “worrisome implications for long-term investment
in research and development, negatively influencing American predominance in
emerging technologies”). In the Bloomberg Index, the United States remained strong
in the category of patent activity (meaning that many patent applications were filed);
the lower categories, however, included tertiary efficiency and research
concentration—how many people are going into and working in science and
technology research and development (R&D). See Jamrisko & Lu, supra note 1. There
is certainly a relationship between workers in the R&D field, spending on research and
development, and innovation.
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economies, including investment in new ideas.6 One particular area
of patent law that has contributed to the erosion of reliable patent
rights is patent-eligible subject matter—or what types of inventions can
be patented. Patent-eligible subject matter, as others have recognized,
is a “real mess.”7 It is chaotic,8 “a foggy standard cloaked as a rule,”9 “rife
with indeterminacy,”10 and in a “state of crisis.”11 Even U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) judges, who are partially
responsible for the state of the doctrine, have expressed concern about the
level of confusion surrounding the doctrine.12 Importantly, the issue of
patent-eligible subject matter disproportionately affects two industries that
represent a substantial sector of the United States economic and innovation
base: biotechnology and computer-related inventions.13

6. See Stephen Haber, Patents and the Wealth of Nations, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811,
814 (2016).
7. Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr.
12, 2016, 4:32 PM) (quoting David Kappos, former Director of the U.S. Patent &
Trademark
Office),
https://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-forabolition-of-section-101-of-patent-act.
8. See The Impact of Bad Patents on American Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Intell. Prop., & the internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3 (2017)
(supplemental statement of Judge Paul R. Michel), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Supplemental-Statement-of-Paul-R-Michel-Sept-122017.pdf (“Patent-eligibility law under § 101 has descended into chaos after a string of
Supreme Court decisions.”).
9. Michael Risch, Nothing is Patentable, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 45, 45 (2015).
10. Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine
Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 941 (2017).
11. David O. Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2149, 2151
(2017) [hereinafter Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility] (“In short, patent law—and in
particular the law governing patent eligibility—is in a state of crisis.”).
12. See, e.g., Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Lourie,
J., concurring) (per curiam) (“I believe the law needs clarification by higher authority,
perhaps by Congress, to work its way out of what so many in the innovation field
consider are § 101 problems.”); see also Ryan Davis, Fed. Circ. Judges’ Plea to Reps Shows
Patent-Eligibility Angst, LAW360 (June 4, 2018, 7:47 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1049274 (quoting Edward R. Reines, who stated, “For a well-respected
Federal Circuit judge to suggest that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is unworkable
and requires legislative attention is a matter of courage”); Gene Quinn, Judge Stoll tells
AIPLA Alice/Mayo ‘a difficult line of cases to administer’, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 26, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/10/26/judge-stoll-aipla-alice-may (quoting Judge
Stoll as saying “One of the more challenging issues I’ve seen since I’ve been at the
court is the 101 test and the Alice/Mayo test. It is a difficult line of cases to administer”).
13. See Jason D. Reinecke, Comment, Is the Supreme Court’s Patentable Subject Matter
Test Overly Ambiguous? An Empirical Test, UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript
at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123524.
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The current chaos that is patent-eligible subject matter arose largely
from a series of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court between 2010
and 2014, followed by aftershocks driven by the lower courts and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) as these
institutions tried to figure out what the Supreme Court had actually
decided. This rapidly developing (or perhaps devolving depending on
your perspective) jurisprudence had two destabilizing effects on patent
law and on innovation more broadly. First, there is immense confusion
about precisely what the test for patent-eligible subject matter is and
how it should be applied.14 Second, a number of previously-issued
patents have been invalidated for lack of patent-eligible subject matter,
raising questions about the viability of extant patent rights in many
important industries.15 These two issues are having negative effects on
the certainty, reliability, and strength of patent rights in this country.16
The first issue—uncertainty as to the test for patent-eligible subject
matter and how it is to be applied—should come as no surprise given
the nebulous test that has been imposed by the Supreme Court.
Specifically, the current test comprises two parts. The first part of the
test asks whether the claims are directed to an ineligible concept,
including laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.17 If
the first question is answered in the affirmative, the second part asks

14. For just a few of the many articles highlighting the uncertain state of patenteligible subject matter, see, for example, Ted G. Dane, Are the Federal Circuit’s Recent
Section 101 Decisions a “Specific Improvement” in Patent Eligibility Law?, 26 FED. CIR. B.J.
331 (2017); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated
Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1796 (2014); Robert Mazzola,
The 101 Conundrum: Creating a Framework to Solve Problems Surrounding the Interpretation
of 35 U.S.C. § 101, 14 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 400 (2015); David O. Taylor, Confusing
Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157 (2016) [hereinafter Taylor, Confusing Patent
Eligibility]. But see Reinecke, supra note 13, at 3 (using an empirical study to claim that
“the new test for patentable subject matter seems less unpredictable than
commentators have suggested”).
15. See generally Bilski Blog, FENWICK & WEST LLP, www.bilskiblog.com (last visited
May 20, 2019) (enter “invalidation rate” in search bar) (regularly reporting
invalidation rates of issued patents for lack of patent-eligible subject matter).
16. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
256, 257 (2015) (discussing the impact of the bar on diagnostic testing patents on
innovation); MICHEL, supra note 8, at 3–4 (“The legal uncertainty [arising from the
chaos of § 101] is devastating American business, including high tech, manufacturing,
biotech, and pharmaceutical industries.”).
17. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216–18 (2014).
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whether the claim’s other elements transform that claim into a patenteligible practical application of an otherwise ineligible concept.18
Sadly, the Supreme Court intended to clarify the doctrine of patenteligible subject matter when it announced the current two-step inquiry,
but this test and how it is to be applied is anything but clear. While the
question of part one invokes uncertainty about what these three
categories of ineligible concepts include, the question of part two is
indeterminate in even what it is seeking. A former Chief Judge of the
Federal Circuit described the test as “too vague, too subjective, too
unpredictable and impossible to administer in a coherent consistent
way.”19 Not surprisingly, others have likened the two-part test to Justice
Stewart’s test for obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”20 Courts have
offered little guidance for implementing these two questions, beyond
stating that routine or conventional steps will be insufficient to render
a claim patent eligible.21
The second type of uncertainty, resulting from the invalidation of
many existing patents, is a different matter altogether. Based on the
Supreme Court’s quadrilogy of patent-eligible subject matter opinions
decided in the last decade, the Patent Office and all levels of courts
have been invalidating many patents as directed to ineligible subject
matter.22 Patents are property rights,23 but are also legal rights that
businesses use for a variety of purposes, including to prevent others
from copying their innovative technology, to signal technological
competence or market strength to investors and the public, to defend
against infringement lawsuits, and to increase cross-licensing
negotiation power.24 In fact, there is a demonstrated relationship

18. See id.
19. See Gene Quinn, Judge Michel says Alice Decision ‘Will Create Total Chaos,’ IP
WATCHDOG (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/08/06/judge-michelsays-alice-decision-will-create-total-chaos (suggesting the Alice decision created a twostep test that is nonsensical).
20. See Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 161 (citing Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
21. See id.
22. See Robert L. Maier, Will Any Software Patents Survive?, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 21, 2017,
2:00 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/
11/21/will-any-software-patents-survive (discussing the “trend of district courts and the
Federal Circuit regularly invalidating software patents” under § 101).
23. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692
(2013) (“Patents have long been identified as property rights in American law.”).
24. See Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An
Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111, 114–15 (2010).
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between a start-up company having a patent and a higher probability
of it receiving venture capital funding and ultimately succeeding as a
business.25 Whether a start-up company or an established firm, patents
are extremely important to many firms’ existence. To the extent that
firms fear that granted patents will be taken away from them, the
patents then lose their value for the various purposes for which they
are being used. This in turn may hamper a business’s ability to
commercialize its technology and deter investment in additional
innovation, or may even spell the end of the firm itself.
The uncertainties surrounding patent-eligible subject matter have
led to multiple calls—from academia, from the bar, from industry, and
more—to fix this doctrine.26 However, the various proposals aimed at
fixing patent-eligible subject matter are doomed to fail. Specifically,
the current proposals generally add more words to the current statute
and are likely to result in tests just as vague and unworkable as the
current statute, with additional words to be misinterpreted.27 More
importantly, however, is that none of the proposals have examined
which institution or institutions would be best suited for determining
patent-eligible subject matter. Even if a clear and appropriate test
could be drafted, if the wrong institution is wielding it, the problem is
unlikely to be resolved.
Instead of simply adding to the cacophony of ineffective reform
proposals, this article advances a radical solution that calls for situating
patent-eligible subject matter inquiries with the institution best suited
for the task and in a way that also may enhance and incentivize
innovation. Specifically, this article argues patent eligibility inquiries
should not be undertaken by the Patent Office. This means two things:
before a patent is issued, the question of patent eligibility should not
be considered by the examiner or by the Patent Trial and Appeals
Board (PTAB or Board), and after a patent is issued, patent-eligible
subject matter should not be the basis for any post-grant review at the
Patent Office. Instead, to the extent patent-eligible subject matter is
in question, these decisions must be made by the courts.
It may seem incongruous to situate patent-eligible subject matter
with the courts, especially as the courts have created a large portion of

25. See Joan Farre-Mensa et al., What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent
“Lottery” 26–27, 30 (U.S. Patent & Trademark Off. Econ. Working Paper No. 2015-5,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2704028.
26. See infra Section II (providing an overview of various reform efforts).
27. See id.
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the mess associated with the doctrine. However, in looking at how to
best fix an uncertain doctrine to align with the purpose of patent law
and applying various tenets of institutional design, the courts become
the optimal choice for this undertaking. Administrative law provides
additional support for courts to take on this task as well. Vesting the
decision-making power with the courts ensures that the issue is before
the best institution for the task. Furthermore, this should incentivize
courts to craft a more workable and certain test for patent-eligible subject
matter, strengthen patent rights, and ultimately, enhance innovation.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a background
of patent-eligible subject matter, including what the doctrine entails,
which institutions currently address the question of subject matter
eligibility, and what sort of mess the doctrine is in. Part II explains
recently proposed reform efforts for patent-eligible subject matter and
why these reforms are unlikely to make a difference for the disastrous
doctrine. Part III describes a radical solution—that determinations of
patent-eligible subject matter should not be made at the Patent
Office—as well as why this solution makes a lot of sense. This Part also
explains why taking this radical step, and taking patent eligibility
decisions away from the Patent Office, is more likely to provide more
clarity to the doctrine than the other proposed reforms, is apt to
strengthen patent law, and will put the United States back at the top of
the list of innovative countries. Finally, this Article ends with a
discussion of recent changes at the Patent Office, and how these
changes could ultimately be used to operationalize the solution
proposed in this Article.
I. THE WHAT, THE WHO, AND THE UGLY OF
PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER
To comprehend why patent-eligible subject matter is a problem and
why it must be fixed, it is essential first to understand how and where
patent-eligible subject matter fits within the patent law system. This
Part will first explain the law of patent-eligible subject matter, how it
relates to other requirements of patentability, and how it evolved to its
current state. Next, this Part will describe the various institutions that
currently decide patent-eligible subject matter and how well these
institutions have been doing in this endeavor. Finally, this Part will
examine some of the effects that have sprung from the patent-eligible
subject matter decisions by these various institutions, as well as detail
how these effects are influencing innovation in the United States.
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A. The Law of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
The United States Patent Act specifies the laws related to obtaining
and enforcing patent rights.28 There are four primary statutory
provisions that describe the legal requirements for patentability—35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112. Courts have interpreted § 102 as
requiring novelty or that the invention be new; § 103 as requiring nonobviousness or that the patent not cover a trivial alteration of a previouslyknown invention; and § 112 as requiring an adequate level of disclosure
to fulfill the quid pro quo aspect of patents.29 Section 101 pulls double
duty, imposing a requirement of utility as well as delineating what types of
inventions can be patented, or patent-eligible subject matter.30
Section 101 states that whoever invents a new “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” or improvement thereof may
obtain a patent, subject to the remaining requirements of
patentability.31 Courts have interpreted this list of categories broadly,
going so far as to claim that “anything under the sun that is made by
man” falls into patent-eligible subject matter.32 In the early 1980s, the
Supreme Court quoted the “anything under the sun” language when
opening the doors to broad swaths of modern invention, including
biotechnology and computer software.33
Although the statute is broad, there are a few judicially-created
exceptions to this otherwise expansive understanding of patenteligible subject matter.
Specifically, laws of nature, natural
phenomenon, and abstract ideas may not be patented.34 These
exceptions were not understood to have significant limiting effects on
patent-eligible subject matter, as courts and the Patent Office deemed
most inventions eligible for patenting through the 1980s and 1990s.35
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–389 (2012).
29. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65
EMORY L.J. 987, 990, 993 (2016).
30. See Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 170–71.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
32. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 821979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
33. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177, 184 (1981) (allowing patenting of a
computer algorithm that controlled a rubber mold); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305, 309–
10 (allowing patenting of oil-eating bacterium).
34. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
35. One last area of uncertainty were business methods. However, after the
Federal Circuit ruled these inventions were eligible for patenting in the State Street Bank
& Trust case, invalidation under § 101 was essentially a “dead letter.” See Mark A.
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This began to change in the early 2000s, when a variety of groups called
for a tightening of patentability standards for a number of reasons.36
The courts seemed to heed these calls, first merely suggesting and later
implementing a stricter view of patent-eligible subject matter.37 The
judicially-created exceptions then took on new importance through
the quartet of Supreme Court cases that ultimately led to the
aforementioned two-step test for patent-eligible subject matter.
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Bilski v. Kappos,38 affirming the
Patent Office’s rejection of a patent application because it claimed an
“abstract idea” and therefore was not eligible for patenting.39 The
invention at issue in Bilski was a method of hedging risk when trading
commodities, and the claims did not require any particular structures
to implement.40 The Court reasoned that the claims were directed to
Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2011) (permitting business
method patents on inventions that produced “a useful, concrete, and tangible result,”
including numbers); see also State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. Co., 149
F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
36. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 14–15 (2003) (contending that “software
and business method patents can raise significant competitive concerns and deter
innovation, especially because so much of the innovation in those fields builds
incrementally on preceding work”).
37. In 2006, in a case that was dismissed as improvidently granted, Justice Breyer
dissented from the dismissal to argue for a more stringent patent-eligible subject
matter requirement. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Federal Circuit then picked up the reins,
finding ineligible subject matter in a number of cases. See generally Bilski, 545 F.3d at
943; In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), superseded by In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
38. 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
39. Id. at 609.
40. Claim 1 of the application at issue in Bilski is representative:
1. A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold
by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk
position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant
transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions.
Ex Parte Bernard L. Bilski & Rand A. Warsaw, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *1
(B.P.A.I. 2006).
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an abstract idea that was “a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce.”41 To allow a patent on
something like this would, according to the Court, preempt the public
from using a basic economic concept.42
The Bilski case was followed two years later by Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,43 where the Supreme Court
determined the claimed invention was directed to an ineligible “law of
nature.”44 The patent at issue in the Mayo case claimed a diagnostic
method, involving the steps of administering a drug, measuring the
level of a metabolite associated with the drug, and, depending on that
level, deciding to increase or decrease the drug’s dosage in that
patient.45 The Court examined these steps and determined that,
beyond the law of nature—that is, the correlation between the
metabolite level and the optimal dosing of the drug—the claim simply
recited “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity” and thus,
it was not eligible for patenting.46
One year after, the Supreme Court in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc.47 determined a patent was invalid because it
claimed a “product of nature.”48 In the Myriad case, the ineligible
claims were directed to isolated DNA segments.49 Although Myriad
41. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.
42. See id. at 611–12
43. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
44. Id. at 77.
45. See id. at 74–75 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col. 20, ll. 10–20). Claim
1 of the patent is exemplary:
1. A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 red
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x108 red
blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject.
46. Id. at 73–74.
47. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
48. Id. at 580.
49. Id. at 584 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, col. 153, ll. 56–58). “The first
claim asserts a patent on ‘[a]n isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide,’ which
has ‘the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.’” Id.
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discovered the location and sequence of some particularly important
genes, the subject of the patent claims was not created via invention.50
Finally, in 2014, the Supreme Court again found an invention to be
ineligible subject matter due to being an “abstract idea” in Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Int’l.51 The invention in this case was a method and system
for managing settlement risks when two parties conduct a financial
transaction.52 The Court determined that the method was an abstract
idea and consisted of “purely conventional” steps to be performed on
a generic computer, and thus was ineligible for patent protection.53 As
to the system claims, the Court held that these failed for the same
reason as the method claims: the general computer system described
added nothing to the underlying abstract idea.54 Again, in making this
determination, the Court relied on the notion of preemption, or the

50. Id.
51. 573 U.S. 208, 227 (2014).
52. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (discussing U.S. Patent No. 5,970,479, col. 65, ll. 23–50). Claim 33 of the ‘479
patent was deemed exemplary:
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party holding a
credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the credit
records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obligations, the
method comprising the steps of:
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution
from the exchange institutions;
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for
each shadow credit record and shadow debit record;
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit
record or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do
not result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value
of the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place
in chronological order; and
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing one[] of the
exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record and
debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjustments of
the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrevocable,
time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions.
Id. at 1285.
53. Alice, 573 U.S. at 222.
54. Id. at 226 (“Put another way, the system claims are no different from the
method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented
on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer
components configured to implement the same idea.”).
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monopolization of a fundamental concept in the relevant field.55
Citing back to Mayo, the Court noted that routine conventional activity,
trivial post-operation actions, and generic or vague limitations are
insufficient to add substantive limitations and avoid preemption.56
This quartet of cases, or quadrilogy, although most specifically the
Alice case, introduced chaos into the doctrine of patent-eligible subject
matter.57 Claiming to rely on its opinion in the Mayo case, the Supreme
Court in Alice articulated the two-step test that is currently the basis of
patent-eligible subject matter decisions.58 The first step involves
determining whether the patent claim is directed to an ineligible
concept, specifically a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea.59 If so, the second step involves determining whether there are
additional elements that transform the claim into an eligible
application of the underlying ineligible concept.60 This second step is
described as a “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[underlying concept] itself.”61 Put more plainly, is the invention
“something more” than simply the ineligible law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea?62
Despite the appeal and seeming simplicity of a two-step test, the
inquiry into patent-eligible subject matter is anything but plain. In
fact, the Supreme Court has not fully explained either of the two steps.
As to whether the claim is directed to an ineligible concept, in each
case of the quadrilogy, the Supreme Court reverted to the oft-repeated
tenet that laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas are
not patentable.63 However, in the time since these judicially created
exceptions were pronounced, the Court has provided very little
55. Id. at 216.
56. Id.
57. Many better, and more complete, discussions of this quartet of cases have been
written by other scholars. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Three Faces of Prometheus: A
Post-Alice Jurisprudence of Abstractions, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 647, 651–57 (2015); Lidiya
Mishchenko, Alice: Through the Formalist Looking-Glass, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 214, 221–24 (2015); Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, supra note 14, at 178.
58. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223.
59. Id. at 217–18.
60. See id.
61. See id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72–73 (2012)).
62. See id. at 217.
63. See id. at 216–17.
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guidance about what exactly these terms mean. In fact, in Alice, the
Court specifically declined to define these excluded categories,
preferring to analogize the invention in the instant case with previous
cases rather than provide clarity about what makes an invention
“abstract.”64 As to the second step, requiring that the claimed invention
include “something more” virtually invites confusion and uncertainty.
With a lack of guidance provided at both steps, it is not surprising that
the lower courts have struggled to apply these exceptions to patenteligible subject matter.65 The Supreme Court overruled previous efforts
by lower courts to add clarity to this area of law.66
Following Alice, the Patent Office and the courts have found patenteligible subject matter to be lacking in the vast majority of cases
considered.67 The bulk of these invalidity cases center around
inventions related to computer and information technology or
biotechnology.68 This is not surprising given the judicially created
exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter include abstract ideas
(computer and information technology), laws of nature, and natural
phenomenon (biotechnology). It is problematic that these subject
areas are particularly affected, given the extent to which they form a
large portion of today’s innovation economy.
What is more troubling, because it is so unexpected, is that courts
and the Patent Office are using § 101 to invalidate patents (and reject
patent applications) in a wide range of non-computer, non-biotechnology
fields. In fact, invalidations for lack of patent-eligible subject matter now
appear in technologies that have long formed the heart of the American
64. See id. at 221 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours
of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no
meaningful distinction between” the invention in Bilski and the invention in Alice).
65. See, e.g., Kelly Mackin, Federal Circuit Guidance is Needed Because District Courts are
Misapplying Alice, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/20
16/04/07/district-courts-misapplying-alice (detailing the rampant invalidation of
claims from hundreds of patents).
66. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (declining to utilize the “machine
or transformation” test imposed by the Federal Circuit to clarify patent-eligible subject
matter for inventions that include potentially abstract ideas).
67. See, e.g., Bilski Blog, supra note 15 (reporting statistics on invalidations and
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
68. See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying
Nothing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 774–76 (2018); see also Chad Gilles, Mayo and Alice Had
Little Impact on Prosecution (Except for a Few Art Units), BIGPATENTDATA (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://bigpatentdata.com/2018/10/subject-matter-eligibility-is-not-that-big-of-a-deal
-except-for-a-few-art-units (noting that some art units in the computer and information
technology space, including units 3620, 3680, and 3690, “went absolutely bananas after Alice”).
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patent system, such as automobiles. In American Axle & Manufacturing,
Inc., v. Neapco Holdings LLC,69 a district court judge invalidated patents on
a technology to reduce vibrations being transmitted through the
drivetrain of a car.70 Despite the fact that the claims were specifically
directed to making a part of a car’s driveline system,71 the judge
determined under the first step of the test that these claims were directed
to laws of nature, specifically Hooke’s law and friction damping.72 The
judge then determined that the claims “are applications of Hooke’s law
with the result of friction damping.”73 However, the judge neglected to
consider the claim as a whole, which was instead directed toward an
industrial process for manufacturing car parts.74 This is what patenteligible subject matter jurisprudence looks like today.
Although this section attempts to provide a brief understanding of
the current state of patent-eligible subject matter, in truth, it is not
easily understood. At a June 11, 2018, meeting of the Intellectual
Property Business Congress (IPBC) Global Conference, Patent Office
Director Andrei Iancu remarked about how difficult it is to explain
what qualifies as patent-eligible subject matter, quoting James
Madison: “It will be of little avail to the people if the laws are so
incoherent that they cannot be understood.”75 This section now turns
to the various institutions that apply this confusing area of law to patent
applications and issued patents.
69. 309 F. Supp. 3d 218 (D. Del. 2018).
70. Id. at 221, 229.
71. For example, a representative claim (claim 22) follows:
A method for manufacturing a shaft assembly of a driveline system, the
driveline system further including a first driveline component and a second
driveline component, the shaft assembly being adapted to transmit torque
between the first driveline component and the second driveline component,
the method comprising:
providing a hollow shaft member;
tuning a mass and a stiffness of at least one liner; and
inserting the at least one liner into the shaft member;
wherein the at least one liner is a tuned resistive absorber for attenuating shell
mode vibrations and wherein the at least one liner is a tuned reactive absorber
for attenuating bending mode vibrations.
Id. at 221.
72. Id. at 225.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 225–28.
75. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks at the
Intellectual Property Business Conference (June 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/
about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-andrei-iancu-ipbc-global-conference.
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B. Institutions Deciding Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
There are three primary institutions that determine patent-eligible
subject matter: the Patent Office examining corps, the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board (PTAB), and the courts. Although the Patent Office
is a single agency, the characteristics of the examining corps and the
PTAB, as well as the instances in which they assess patent-eligible
subject matter, vary sufficiently to discuss them as different institutions
for the purpose of this Article. This section will describe these three
institutions, as well as one other unique institution that decides patenteligible subject matter with less frequency—the International Trade
Commission. This section will conclude with an explanation of how
these institutions decide the issue of patent eligibility at various points
during a patent’s life cycle.
1.

Patent Office—Examining Corps
The examining corps at the Patent Office is often the first institution to
consider the subject matter eligibility of an invention. An examiner
determines whether a patent application satisfies the patentability
requirements, including novelty, non-obviousness, and adequate disclosure,
as well as whether the invention claimed in the application satisfies § 101.76
Patent examiners must be U.S. citizens and have successfully
completed a four-year course of study “at an accredited college or
university leading to a bachelor’s degree, or higher, that included a
major field of study . . . in a variety of engineering and science
disciplines.”77 No advanced technological training is required, nor is
any legal training or knowledge.78 Patent examiners do, however, go
through a training program that includes teaching sessions about the
law and examination procedures, as well as hands-on training by
working on actual patent applications under close supervision.79

76. Gene Quinn, USPTO Wants YOU for the Patent Examining Corp, IP WATCHDOG
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/04/uspto-wants-you-for-thepatent-examing-corp/id=8729.
77. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS: EXAMINER
BROCHURE, https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Examiner%20br
ochure%202017.pdf (last visited May 20, 2019) [hereinafter ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS].
78. Id.
79. See Michael D. Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J.
1601, 1620–21 (2016).
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Patent examiners are guided in their work by policy statements,
guidelines, and manuals issued by the Patent Office.80 The most
prevalent guidance document is the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure, which does not have the force of law, but is considered
within the Patent Office to be the “bible” of patent examination.81 The
examining corps may also avail itself of additional guidance in a variety
of memoranda focused on clarifying previously provided Patent Office
guidance in light of new case law.82
Measured by volume, the examining corps of the Patent Office
arguably has the greatest amount of experience determining patenteligible subject matter. Over 647,000 patent applications were filed
with the Patent Office in fiscal year 2017.83 To be sure, not all of these
applications require a detailed analysis of patent-eligible subject
matter; in fact, not all of these applications ever reach an examiner’s
desk.84 Regardless, patent examiners make the vast majority of patenteligible subject matter decisions each year.
Although patent examiners may handle the greatest number of
patent eligibility inquiries, their efforts are viewed as the least
important as far as developing the jurisprudence of the doctrine. First,
rejections from patent examiners are secret until a patent issues.85
Patent prosecution is an ex parte activity that is not laid open to the
public before a patent is granted.86 If no patent ever issues, an
examiner’s rejection may never be seen.87 Second, and related, an

80. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 394 (2011).
81. See id.
82. See id. See generally Memoranda to the Examining Corps, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/me
moranda-examining-corps (last visited May 20, 2019).
83. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FY17 27 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOF
Y17PAR.pdf.
84. Patent applications can be abandoned at any time during the examination
process. See 711 Abandonment of Patent Application [R-07.2015], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s711.html (last modified Jan.
24, 2018, 5:19 PM) (detailing express and unintentional abandonment).
85. Gene Quinn, Understanding the Patent Process: Rejections vs. Objections, IP
WATCHDOG (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/04/02/patent-processrejections-vs-objections.
86. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE § 5.1, at 32–33
(2d ed. 2004). Prior to 2000, everything was kept secret until a patent issued. See id.
87. If the application is abandoned, the public may never learn about the
prosecution history. See id. at 34.
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examiner’s rejection is often not the last word on the subject. If the
patent applicant believes the examiner erroneously rejected the
application, the applicant can appeal the rejection to the PTAB.88 At
this point, the rejection becomes (more) public, but the
determination moves to a different institution.89 Third, patent
examiners have limited discretion in making patent eligibility
determinations. To keep up with the quick evolution of the doctrine,
the Patent Office issues numerous guidance documents to aid the
examining corps in following the courts’ rulings when deciding patenteligible subject matter.90 Examiners are unlikely to deviate from the
Patent Office’s guidance documents because it would be unnecessarily
time-consuming and may have negative career repercussions.91 For
these reasons, it is unlikely that the examining corps of the Patent Office
has a significant effect on the law of patent-eligible subject matter.
Although the examining corps may not have a significant effect as
far as shaping the law, it does have a substantial, if silent, effect on
innovation more generally. Specifically, decisions of the examining
corps may “nip” certain technologies in the bud by cutting off patent
protection at a very early stage. Individual companies may alter their
spending decisions regarding research and development based on
patent eligibility signals received from the Patent Office, which could
have a direct impact on innovation.92
Additionally, negative
determinations by the examining corps may have a broader effect on
innovation by limiting the amount of disclosure, because the patent
does not issue, and limiting the products that reach the market, because
a company may decline to commercialize technology it cannot protect
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1) (2012) (authorizing PTAB review of “adverse decisions
of examiners upon applications for patents”). Some 10,000 of these ex parte appeals
are resolved by the PTAB each year. See John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron:
The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1667 (2016).
89. See infra Section I.B.2 (discussing the PTAB’s qualifications as a patenteligibility decider).
90. See, e.g., Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subjectmatter-eligibility (last visited May 20, 2019); see also Jeffrey A. Lefstin et al., Final Report
of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology Section 101 Workshop: Addressing Patent Eligibility
Challenges, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 551, 561 (2018).
91. See Wasserman, supra note 80, at 397–98.
92. See, e.g., Amanda G. Ciccatelli, Revising Section 101 of the Patent Act: What’s at
Stake?, IP WATCHDOG (July 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/26/revisi
ng-section-101-patent-act (noting that the patent eligibility standard may be having a
chilling effect on patent rights, altering the incentives for private companies to invest
in research); see also Coons, supra note 5.
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via patent rights. In keeping information and products from the public,
future innovators may find fewer “shoulders of giants” to stand on.93
2.

Patent Office—PTAB
More than any other institution, the PTAB has an opportunity to
consider patent-eligible subject matter at multiple points of a patent’s
life. The PTAB hears appeals of rejections from the examining corps,
which may include questions of patent-eligible subject matter.94
Additionally, the PTAB may consider subject matter eligibility of issued
patents via post-grant proceedings, specifically via post-grant review or
covered business method review.95
The PTAB is a group of administrative patent judges within the
Patent Office.96 Per statute, administrative patent judges are “persons
of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed
by the Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the Director.”97
Sitting in panels of at least three members,98 PTAB judges hear not just
appeals from “adverse decisions of examiners,” but also
reexaminations of issued patents, inter partes reviews, post-grant
reviews, and covered business method reviews.99

93. This phrase is typically attributed to Isaac Newton: “If I have seen farther, it is
by standing on the shoulders of giants.” Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke
(Feb. 5, 1675), reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A
SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT 1 (1993). The phrase more recently gained popularity in the
innovation space. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991).
94. See Stephen Ball & Victor P. Lin, Using Ex Parte Patent Appeals to Advance
Prosecution, LAW360 (Mar. 15, 2016, 10:45 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/769482/using-ex-parte-patent-appeals-to-advance-prosecution. The PTAB generally
affirms the examiner’s rejections in cases involving patent-eligible subject matter. See id.
95. See, e.g., Philip Swain, The Remarkable Effectiveness of Alice v. CLS Bank Challenges
at the PTAB, FOLEY HOAG LLP: PTAB BLOG (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.ptabblog.com/2015/10/23/the-remarkable-effectiveness-of-alice-v-cls-bank-challenges-at-the-ptab.
96. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). The PTAB’s membership also includes the Patent
Office Director and Deputy Director, as well as the Commissioners for Patents and for
Trademarks. See id.
97. See id. The statutory criteria do not set a terribly high threshold. Gene Quinn,
the founder of IP Watchdog, studied the qualifications of the currently sitting PTAB
administrative law judges and deemed them “shockingly inexperienced.” See Gene
Quinn, PTAB Judges Shockingly Inexperienced Compared to District Court Judges, IP
WATCHDOG (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/06/ptab-judgesshockingly-inexperienced.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c).
99. § 6(b).
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The PTAB, while deciding patent-eligible subject matter less
frequently than the examining corps, still has ample opportunity to
consider the issue. For example, the PTAB regularly has over 12,000
appeals pending annually of rejections from examiners.100 Of course,
not all of these cases include patent-eligible subject matter rejections;
however, because the PTAB can initiate review of subject matter
eligibility sua sponte,101 it could potentially be considered in all of these
cases. Additionally, between 2012—when the proceedings became
available—and October 2017, there were 529 covered business method
review petitions and 82 post-grant review petitions filed at the PTAB.102
While these post-grant proceedings do not necessarily include a patenteligibility challenge, it is a commonly raised ground of invalidation.
Regardless of how the issue comes before it, the PTAB has been
aggressively developing the contours of patent-eligible subject matter.103
Unlike the examining corps at the Patent Office, the PTAB’s patenteligible subject matter decisions carry greater weight in the grand
scheme of the doctrine because the PTAB’s influence is felt in multiple
directions, both by the examining corps and by the courts. The
influence of the PTAB on the examining corps is hard to quantify
because it is often of a more personal nature. Specifically, a particular
examiner’s understanding of patent-eligible subject matter is going to
be directly influenced by his experiences from appeals of his previous
cases before the PTAB. The PTAB’s affirmance of the examiner’s
rejections will likely encourage the examiner to continue to issue these
rejections going forward. If the PTAB sua sponte rejects a patent
application under § 101 that the examiner had not rejected, the incentive
to issue ineligible subject matter rejections in the future may be increased.
On the other hand, the PTAB’s influence on the courts is much easier to
100. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., APPEAL & INTERFERENCE STATISTICS: PATENT
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 3 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/appeal_interference_statistics_2017oct.pdf. Prior to fiscal year 2016, the
PTAB had over 20,000 pending appeals annually. See id.
101. See Kristen Osenga, The Problem with PTAB’s Power over Section 101, 17 CHI.-KENT
J. OF INTELL. PROP. 405, 407 (2018).
102. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics_october_2017.
pdf. The trend continued, with five CBM and four PGR petitions filed in October
2017. See id. at 5 (reporting fiscal year 2018 filings to date).
103. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1577 (2016) (noting that, especially within the CBM
context, “the PTAB has . . . been aggressive, particularly with respect to its
interpretation of section 101”).
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see because jurisprudence developed by the PTAB is often accepted
wholesale by the courts. Patent-eligible subject matter decisions are
regularly affirmed by the Federal Circuit and often without opinion.104
The PTAB’s patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence is also
having a significant impact on innovation. The PTAB has been called
a “death squad”105 and a “killing field.”106 Although these monikers
were earned for more than just the PTAB’s stance on patent-eligible
subject matter, the problem is striking enough that multiple blogs are
devoted, at least in part, to tracking the PTAB’s § 101 decisions.107
While the Patent Office is the initial obstacle for patent applicants,
particularly in the patent-eligible subject matter arena, the PTAB may
be the final hurdle standing between an inventor and a patent.108 The
PTAB also has significant power to end an issued patent’s life.109
Because PTAB determinations have been, at best, uncertain, and at

104. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 794 fig.12.
105. See Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform
Bill, BNA (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n17179879684
(stating that on one side of the PTO “[y]ou have 7000 people giving birth to property
rights,” but within the PTAB, there are as many as 300 administrative patent judges
“acting as death squads, killing property rights”).
106. See, e.g., Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Patent Killing Fields of the PTAB:
Erasing Federal District Court Verdicts on Patent Validity, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 14, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/14/patent-killing-fields-ptab-erasing-federaldistrict-court-verdicts-patent-validity.
107. See, e.g., Bilski Blog, supra note 15; Post Grant Proceedings, BIRCH, STEWART,
KOLASCH & BIRCH, LLP, https://www.postgrantproceedings.com (last visited May 20,
2019); Post-Grant, FISH & RICHARDSON LLP, http://fishpostgrant.com (last visited May
20, 2019); PTAB Watch:
Section 101, MARSHALL, GERSTEIN, & BORUN LLP,
https://www.ptabwatch.com/category/section-101 (last visited May 20, 2019).
108. See, e.g., Lauren Hockett & Christopher M. DiLeo, Analogous Analysis: A Survey
of Recent PTAB Decisions Establishing Subject Matter Patent Eligibility, KNOBBE MARTENS
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/04/analogous-analysis-surveyrecent-ptab-decisions-establishing-subject-matter-patent (highlighting recent cases
where the PTAB ruled that there was patent-eligible subject matter over an examiner’s
rejection); Robert R. Sachs, The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm,
BILSKI BLOG (June 20, 2015), https://www.bilskiblog.com/2015/06/the-one-yearanniversary-the-aftermath-of-alicestorm (providing data on patent-eligible subject
matter rejections at the Patent Office). This data has been regularly updated, and
although there are slight signs that patent-eligible subject matter rejections are
decreasing, they still remain an issue. See, e.g., Robert R. Sachs, AliceStorm Update for Q1
2017, BILSKI BLOG (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/04/alicestor
m-update-for-q1-2017.
109. See, e.g., Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 955 (“The PTAB, however,
continues aggressively to invalidate patents with § 101 rejections, as its ‘kill rate’ in the
CBM program remains a remarkable 97.8%.”).
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worst, anti-patent, these decisions are greatly influencing how
corporations invest in innovative activities going forward.110
Because the PTAB can decide patent-eligible subject matter both
before a patent issues as well as after, the consequences to innovation
are great.111 Just as with the examining corps, when the PTAB rejects
an application, it can have the localized effect of altering that
company’s future research and development trajectory, as well as the
broader effect of keeping information and products from the public.
When the PTAB invalidates an issued patent, it will likely have a
localized effect on the particular patent owner, but because the patent
(and often a product) are available to the public, the broader effect on
innovation may be smaller in nature.
3.

Courts
Patent-eligible subject matter decisions are also being made by
courts at all levels. Federal district courts decide the issue as a regular
part of patent infringement lawsuits, with the alleged infringer
claiming in defense the patent is invalid due to failure to meet § 101.112
The Federal Circuit decides appeals from district court patent
infringement lawsuits as well as appeals of various sorts from the
PTAB.113 Finally, the Supreme Court hears appeals of both types of

110. Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 589–90; Kevin Madigan, An Ever-Weakening Patent
System is Threatening the Future of American Innovation, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL.
PROP. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2017/04/28/an-ever-weakening-patentsystem-is-threatening-the-future-of-american-innovation (citing Robert Sterne and Judge
Michel at a conference where they indicated that investment in innovation is down, due
in part to the PTAB and uncertainty in patent law).
111. See Osenga, supra note 101, at 406–08.
112. Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over “any civil action arising
under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). This
includes cases brought by patent owners, alleging infringement, as well as declaratory
judgment actions filed by accused infringers, alleging the patent they are accused of
infringing is either not infringed or is invalid.
113. See Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A
Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 389–91 (1984). The Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction over three types of patent cases, granted by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act (FCIA). See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1801 (2013). These three patent case types are (1) federal
district court cases “arising under” patent law, including patent infringement suits or
suits seeking declaratory judgments of patent invalidity; (2) appeals from the Patent
Office, including appeals of rejected patent applications and post-issuance review
proceedings; and (3) appeals from International Trade Commission investigations
regarding importation of products that allegedly infringe patents. See id.

2019]

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION

1213

cases decided by the Federal Circuit, including patent infringement
cases and appeals from the Patent Office.
It is not easy to generally describe the characteristics of federal
judges, particularly across the various levels from district court to
Supreme Court. Per the Constitution, federal judges are nominated
by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.114
However, the Constitution sets forth no further qualifications for
judges.115
The Senate Judiciary Committee typically conducts
Federal judges, once confirmed, are
confirmation hearings.116
117
appointed for life.
Because there are no formal criteria for being
nominated and confirmed as a judge, and because judges’ life tenure
means that the aggregate of currently sitting judges has been nominated
and confirmed by a variety of political actors across time, the education
and background of the judiciary as a whole is incredibly varied.
Although the Supreme Court hears the least number of patenteligible subject matter cases, the topic has clearly caught the Court’s
interest and imagination with four § 101 cases being decided over the
span of four years, even with the Court’s limited docket.118
Additionally, as the highest court, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on patent-eligible subject matter carries substantial weight with the
lower courts and the Patent Office. However, the ambiguous two-part
test crafted by the Supreme Court has left “district courts and the
Federal Circuit to fend for themselves.”119 With this much confusion
being instilled by the Supreme Court, it makes sense to place the blame
for patent eligibility chaos with that institution.120 To be fair, though,
the cases the Supreme Court has to work with are not always the best,121
and so some responsibility must also lie with the other courts.

114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115. See FAQs: Federal Judges, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-federaljudges (last visited May 20, 2019).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See Ciccatelli, supra note 92.
119. See Reinecke, supra note 13, at 8.
120. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Naked Emperors: A Supreme Court Patent Tale, IP WATCHDOG
(May 31, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/31/naked-emperors-asupreme-court-patent-tale.
121. See, e.g., Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al., Debate on In re Bilski, 7 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 260, 276 (2009) (noting that Bilski was a “bad case” for the Court to
elucidate patent-eligible subject matter because “the Bilski invention would have been
rejected for obviousness, if nothing else”).
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The Federal Circuit has long been considered, and generally fancies
itself, the “last word” on substantive patent law issues.122 Particularly
before the Supreme Court took great interest in patent law, the Federal
Circuit was essentially the Supreme Court of patents.123 Now, when the
Supreme Court intervenes in patent law, it is typically because the Federal
Circuit has run amok, generally by creating a bright-line test where the
Supreme Court believes the analysis should be fuzzier.124 Rarely does the
Supreme Court grant certiorari to affirm the Federal Circuit.125
Because of the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit regularly, and enthusiastically,
exercises its ability and desire to develop doctrine in patent law,
including subject matter eligibility. For example, in 1998, the Federal
Circuit crafted the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test for
determining whether a potentially abstract idea was eligible for
patenting.126 A decade later, the same court decided the test was not
fully adequate for its purpose and imposed instead the “machine-ortransformation” test, where a process invention was deemed eligible
for patenting so long as either it was “tied to a particular machine or
apparatus” or “transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.”127 Although the Supreme Court ultimately overruled the
“machine-or-transformation” test as the sole test for eligibility, the
Court acknowledged that the Federal Circuit’s test was “a useful and

122. See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009) (arguing
that the Federal Circuit faces little competition from the PTO because, according to
its own precedent, the PTO lacks substantive rulemaking power and should receive
“weak” deference for its interpretations of the Patent Act).
123. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387 (referring to the Federal Circuit as “the de facto supreme court of patents”).
124. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 42–62 (2010) (discussing
several cases, including Festo, KSR, eBay, and Bilski, that demonstrate the Supreme Court’s
more holistic approach in softening the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rules).
125. This is not necessarily unique to the Federal Circuit, nor is it necessarily
problematic. See John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative
Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 558 (2010) (noting that
from the October 1996 Term through the October 2008 Term, the Supreme Court
decided thirteen patent cases in which it reversed the Federal Circuit in seven, vacated
the judgment in four, and affirmed in two).
126. State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding the “practical
application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation” is not an
unpatentable abstract idea when it produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result”).
127. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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important clue, an investigative tool” for understanding patent-eligible
subject matter.128 Most recently, the Federal Circuit issued a number
of decisions attempting to flesh out the Supreme Court’s vague, twostep test.129 Without question, the Federal Circuit has and will continue
to have significant impact on patent-eligible subject matter.
The district courts in general do not develop overarching patenteligible subject matter law. District courts generally only consider
subject matter eligibility in the context of patent litigation, while the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court currently decide patent-eligible
subject matter on appeals from unsuccessful patent applicants from
the Patent Office, as well as subject matter eligibility of issued patents
from PTAB post-issuance proceedings and from patent infringement
litigation.130 Because the Supreme Court especially (and to a lesser
extent, the Federal Circuit) have not fully fleshed out the test for
patent-eligible subject matter, many eligibility decisions at the district
courts are being made via analogy to previously decided cases. In this
way, the district courts’ opinions, although not binding in other cases,
are providing some detail to the contours of the doctrine.
Like the decisions of the Patent Office, the courts’ opinions on
patent-eligible subject matter are also having an effect on innovation.
The Supreme Court has not determined any invention it has reviewed
to be patent-eligible subject matter.131 The Federal Circuit has found
patent-eligible subject matter in less than ten percent of its post-Alice
cases on the issue.132 District courts also tend to invalidate patents due

128. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
129. For a few notable examples on the computer and information technology side,
see Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and McRO, Inc. v.
Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). On the biotechnology
or pharmaceutical side, see Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals
International, Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
130. Compare Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 412, 417 (D.
Del. 2016) (patent infringement litigation), and Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. Cellzdirect, Inc.,
83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2015), vacated and remanded by Rapid Litig. Mgmt.
Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed Cir. 2016) (patent infringement
litigation), with Vanda Pharm., Inc., 887 F.3d at 1120 (patent infringement appeal), In
re Verhoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (appeal of unsuccessful patent
application), and Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (PTAB post-issuance proceeding).
131. See supra Section I.A. (discussing the Supreme Court’s patent-eligible subject
matter jurisprudence).
132. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 768 (finding the Federal Circuit has
a 92.3% invalidity rate).
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to ineligible subject matter.133 To the extent these courts are
invalidating issued patents or affirming rejections by the Patent Office,
the courts at all levels are having an impact on the way companies
decide to spend, or not spend, their innovation dollars.
In some respects, the effect on innovation when the courts address
subject matter eligibility may seem more significant if the outcome is
invalidation of an issued patent. After all, the company not only
invested the original research and development resources to create the
technology, but also the legal resources to patent the invention and
likely additional research and development funds to commercialize
and bring a product to market. It may seem counterintuitive to say
that innovation could be less affected in these cases, but if innovation
is considered more broadly, there are benefits to allowing patents to
issue and later have them declared invalid. Specifically, the issuance
of a patent and the potential that a company will have commercialized
the technology described in the patent means that the information,
and possibly a product, are available to the public.
4.

Other institutions
Although it does not come into play as often, there is one additional
body that can and does apply patent law in a quasi-judicial setting—the
International Trade Commission (ITC). Cases may be brought before
the ITC to determine whether to bar importation of products alleged
to infringe U.S. patents.134 Although it decides fewer cases and patent
eligibility questions are less often raised, this institution has the
opportunity to rule on § 101 questions. However, because of its unique
jurisdiction and relatively low number of cases, the ITC does not serve
as a primary arbiter of patent-eligible subject matter, and its
jurisprudence has little effect on other institutions.135

133. See Bijal Vakil et al., Months after Berkheimer and Aatrix: Business as Usual, WHITE & CASE
TECH. NEWSFLASH (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/monthsafter-berkheimer-and-aatrix-business-usual (noting that between 2014 and 2017, district courts
assessed patent-eligible subject matter in more than 400 opinions and in many cases found the
patent invalid and since 2017, district courts are still finding a lack of patent-eligible subject
matter at a similar rate).
134. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012) (authorizing the ITC to determine
whether imported products infringe U.S. patents).
135. Many ITC cases are also accompanied by parallel district court proceedings.
See Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 217 (2015)
(“Patented import investigations before the ITC, for example, routinely affect parallel
district court litigation.”).
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5.

When these institutions decide patent-eligible subject matter
Patent-eligible subject matter can be assessed at a number of points
during a patent’s life. Before the patent is issued, the inquiry is made
during patent prosecution regarding the patent eligibility of the
invention described in the patent application. After a patent is
granted, patent-eligible subject matter is one ground on which to
invalidate the issued patent, either in litigation or administratively.
This subsection describes in more detail the various inflection points
at which eligibility is assessed and when the three primary institutions
described above come into play.
Subject matter eligibility is first assessed during patent prosecution
by a member of the examining corps at the Patent Office.136 If the
patent examiner determines the application is lacking in patenteligible subject matter and is not persuaded by the applicant’s
arguments to the contrary, the applicant may appeal the rejection to
the PTAB that, among other things, reviews rejections issued by
examiners.137 The PTAB can also consider whether a patent
application is directed to patent-eligible subject matter sua sponte, if
the patent application is before the body on appeal from a rejection
under some other requirement of patentability, such as novelty or nonobviousness.138 An applicant may appeal a negative determination of
the PTAB to the Federal Circuit (and ultimately may seek certiorari at
the Supreme Court);139 this is the posture of the Bilski v. Kappos case.140
During an examination, if an examiner determines a patent
application satisfies the requirements of patentability, the patent is

136. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n examiner should
generally first satisfy herself that the application’s claims are drawn to patent-eligible
subject matter.”), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
137. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 134(a). The PTAB can affirm an examiner’s rejection
or reverse and remand to the examining corps for additional proceedings. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) (2011).
138. See Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, PTAB Enters Sua Sponte Patent Eligibility Rejections,
PHARMAPATENTS (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2018/02/06/ptabenters-sua-sponte-patent-eligibility-rejections (listing Ex Parte Patterson, No. 2016-001355
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2017), as an example of such an action).
139. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145. An unhappy applicant can also file a civil action in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, but this route is generally
not taken in patent-eligible subject matter cases. See § 145.
140. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599–600 (2010) (noting the procedural
posture of the case from an examiner’s rejection to an appeal before the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (the predecessor to the PTAB), to the Federal
Circuit (en banc), and ultimately to the Supreme Court).
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then granted.141 However, patent-eligible subject matter may still be
raised in attempts to invalidate an issued patent. Challenges to issued
patents may take the form of administrative review, via post-grant
review proceedings brought before the PTAB.142 Alternatively, an
alleged infringer may raise the defense of patent invalidity before a
district court by claiming an issued patent is drawn to ineligible subject
matter.143 Whether the initial decision on eligibility comes from the
PTAB or a district court, the losing party may appeal the case to the
Federal Circuit and ultimately the Supreme Court.144 The Alice case
arose from a district court case where CLS Bank sought declaratory
judgment that the patent at issue was invalid or not infringed.145
As the above description demonstrates, the various institutions
consider patent-eligible subject matter at a variety of sequential, and
sometimes overlapping, points along a patent’s life. Complicating
matters further is that these paths or tracks are not exclusive of one
another; for example, a patent may survive one challenge to its
eligibility during patent examination and be subject to another
challenge as an issued patent. Alternatively, a patent may survive a
validity challenge in the courts, but be found invalid for lack of patenteligible subject matter by the PTAB.146 Not only are patent-eligible
141. See General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct.
2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerningpatents (“If, on examination of the application, or at a later stage during the
reconsideration of the application, the patent application is found to be allowable, a
Notice of Allowance and Fee(s) Due will be sent to the applicant.”).
142. Patent-eligible subject matter may be raised as part of either a PGR or CBM.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012); id. § 318 (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)).
143. See, e.g., Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, No. 14-cv-03228-EDL, 2017 WL
6311568, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (noting that Cepheid responded to the charge
of patent infringement by claiming the allegedly infringed patent was ineligible for
protection); Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 412, 417 (D.
Del. 2016) (same); Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 774, 776
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (noting that Cellzdirect sought summary judgment for patent
invalidity due to ineligible subject matter), vacated, Rapid Lit. Mgmt. Ltd. v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). An issued patent may also be
reviewed by the ITC during infringement lawsuits brought before that body.
144. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (providing Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from
district court decisions arising under patent law, as well as over appeals from the PTAB).
145. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 214 (2014) (explaining that
CLS Bank sought declaratory judgment, which the District Court granted, but the
Federal Circuit reversed).
146. While not limited to § 101 challenges, Gene Quinn and his fellow authors
provide interesting statistics. 168 of the 220 patents studied were found not invalid by
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subject matter challenges not exclusive, they may even happen in
parallel.147 For example, administrative invalidation proceedings are
often brought at the PTAB simultaneously to the same allegation being
made in court as a defense to patent infringement claims.148 Finally,
eligibility decisions along different paths may have inconsistent
preclusive or estoppel effects.149 The estoppel picture is even more
convoluted, given that multiple different parties may have standing to
challenge subject matter eligibility in the variety of institutions. For
example, while a justiciable case or controversy must exist for patent
eligibility to be determined by a court, anyone other than the patentee is
entitled to file an administrative invalidation action before the PTAB.150
Regardless of which institution, be it the examining corps or the
PTAB at the Patent Office, or one of the many levels of courts, and
the courts, but were found invalid by the PTAB. Fifty-eight of the patents invalidated
by the PTAB were found invalid on the exact same grounds as those raised before the
courts that had found them to be not invalid. Gene Quinn et al., PTAB Facts: An Ugly
Picture of a Tribunal Run Amok, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/01/08/ptab-facts-ugly-picture-tribunal-run-amok.
147. See Anne Layne-Farrar, The Other Thirty Percent: An Economic Assessment of
Duplication in PTAB Proceedings and Patent Infringement Litigation 2 (June 28, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/TheOther-30-Percent-An-Economic-Assessment-of-Duplication-in-PTAB-Proceedings-and-Pa
tent-Infringement-Litigation.pdf. Based on multiple studies, Layne-Farrar reports 86.7%
of inter partes review (IPR) and CBM proceedings are also being litigated in district
courts. See id. Of these, stays were granted in 70% of the cases, leaving 30% of
proceedings to continue in parallel. See id.
148. See id.
149. For example, issued patents can be challenged before the PTAB or district
courts. For issues originally brought before the PTAB, estoppel depends on the type
of proceeding. If the patent-eligible subject matter challenge was raised via PGR, the
party seeking PGR may not, if a final written decision is issued, request another
proceeding before the Patent Office, district court, or ITC based on “any ground that
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised” during the PGR. See Jason Mock,
Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO and the Rising Tide of Federal Circuit Appeals, 25 FED.
CIR. B.J. 15, 21 (2015). For a CBM on the other hand, subsequent proceedings at a
district court are estopped only if the arguments were actually raised, while subsequent
proceedings at the Patent Office are estopped under the same “raised or reasonably
could have been raised” standard as PGR. Id.; see also Steven Pollinger & Craig Tolliver,
How Many Bites at the Apple After a PTAB Challenge?, LAW360 (July 25, 2017, 12:00 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/945865.
150. There are some exclusions to who may file an administrative invalidation
proceeding. For example, 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 states that “[a] person who is not the
owner of a patent may file” an inter partes review petition, unless (a) the petitioner has
already filed a court action challenging validity; (b) the petition is filed more than a
year after the petitioner was served with a complaint alleging infringement; or (c) the
petitioner is estopped on some other ground. 37 C.F.R. § 42.101 (2016).
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regardless of where in a patent’s life subject matter eligibility is being
considered, the test being imposed creates a high level of confusion and
uncertainty. The next section describes the mess this system is causing.
C. The Resulting Mess of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
As a consequence of these varied institutions developing patenteligible subject matter jurisprudence, in parallel by multiple actors and
without much guidance from the top, the current status of subject
matter eligibility is, as noted in the introduction, a real mess.151 There
are at least three problems related to the multiple institutions that have
contributed to the chaos. These problems include: (1) that the
institutions have developed the doctrine without care; (2) that the
institutions have declined to fully develop the doctrine; and (3) that
the institutions, as well as the parties that appear before them, are
misusing the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter. Each of these
problems is discussed below.
First, various institutions are developing the doctrine of patenteligible subject matter without care or attention to the Constitution or
existing patent law. As noted above, the examining corps is generally
simply following the doctrine developed by the PTAB and the courts,
but these two institutions, and the courts especially, seem to have
largely imagined the doctrine out of thin air, with little consideration
given to the history of the doctrine and purpose of patent law.152 Both
historically and in developing the 1952 Patent Act, the drafters
repeatedly explained for what types of “inventions” or “discoveries”
patents are available.153 The Constitution expressly states, and
innumerable commentaries written since have discussed, the purpose
for granting patents—to promote the useful arts and sciences—that
should inform the types of inventions that are patent-eligible subject

151. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
152. See Lefstin et. al, supra note 90, at 554 (citing Brief of Professors Jeffrey A. Lefstin
& Peter S. Menell as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner for a Writ of Certiorari,
Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016), 2016 WL 1605520)).
153. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101 (2012) (defining “invention” as “invention or
discovery” and authorizing one who “invents or discovers” to apply for a patent); Act
of February 21, 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793) (also referring to “invention or
discovery” and “inventor or discoverer”); Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790)
(authorizing a patent to any person who “invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device . . . if they shall deem the invention or
discovery sufficiently useful and important”).
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matter.154 Yet, these historical (or even contemporary) guideposts are
not referenced by the case law generated by the PTAB and the courts,
nor is there any nod to the purpose of patent law. Rather, some of the
recent patent-eligible subject matter cases are not about promoting the
purpose of patent law at all. Instead, they are a ham-handed attempt
to solve an unrelated (and not necessarily real) problem related to
patent licensing firms, pejoratively known as “patent trolls.”155
Similarly, the current case law does not address the statutory
structure of the provisions that accompany § 101. The statute that
gives rise to patent-eligible subject matter speaks directly to other
requirements of patentability, stating “[w]hoever invents . . . any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”156 But even though the statute itself
contemplates these other requirements, the two-part test’s search for
an “inventive concept” or “something more” clearly imports one or
more of a panoply of other patentability requirements, such as novelty
or non-obviousness, that are provided in other provisions of the Patent
Act. By ignoring the history and purpose, as well as other functional
provisions of the Patent Act, the various institutions have unnecessarily
interjected confusion into the doctrine.
Although the PTAB and courts of all levels are responsible for
developing patent-eligible subject matter without regard for the
purposes of patent law and the underlying statutory structure, the
Supreme Court bears a special responsibility for the mess. While the
PTAB, the district courts, and even the Federal Circuit generally
approach their decisions in a workmanlike fashion, the Supreme Court
is supposed to consider the law more broadly, especially with respect
to the Constitution. And on other occasions, in addition to addressing
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). See generally Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful,
98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1076 (2014) (“[T]he USPTO only awards patents for inventions that
add to the public storehouse of knowledge and support the patent system’s broader mission
of promoting scientific progress and extending the frontiers of knowledge.”).
155. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 719 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer,
J., concurring) (extolling the virtues of patent-eligible subject matter as providing a
“bulwark against vexatious infringement suits”); see also Robert P. Merges, The Trouble
with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583,
1586 (2009) (“Some believe the troll label is a meaningless epithet, applied only to a
plaintiff in a patent lawsuit with whom one has a legal conflict.”).
156. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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the specific patent law doctrine before it, the Supreme Court has often
taken the opportunity to inject a constitutional bent to their analysis.
For example, in a rather straightforward case to interpret and flesh out
the law of non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Supreme Court
waxed extensively about the constitutional underpinnings of the
doctrine.157 Yet, in cases of patent-eligible subject matter that could
have significant effects on innovation and beyond, the Court has not
delved deeply into the purposes the law is meant to serve.
Second, these institutions have declined to fully develop patenteligible subject matter. For many years, rejections or invalidations
under § 101 simply did not occur. Prior to the Mayo decision, patenteligible subject matter was rarely considered an issue.158 If it was taught
in a Patent Law course in law school, it generally did not even warrant
a full class period. In practice, it was considered an oddity—something
rarely seen.159 Because it was not a common occurrence, there really
was very little development of patent-eligible subject matter
jurisprudence before 2010.
However, after Mayo, the number of invalidations based on patenteligible subject matter “skyrocketed.”160 Once it became clear that
patent eligibility was going to become a more important issue in patent
law, the institutions deciding the issue did not take the opportunity to
fill in what was a really large void, based on decades where subject
matter eligibility was simply not considered. The flood of cases that
have followed each of the Supreme Court’s opinions did not answer
the questions that were already at issue in these cases; they simply left
a larger pool of questions to be answered. Where is the line between
discovery and invention? Are algorithms all ineligible abstract ideas?
What is the relationship between preemption and patent eligibility?
What is the relationship between patent eligibility and the remaining
157. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966).
158. See Shai Jalfin, 6 Years Later: The Effects of the Mayo Decision on Diagnostic Methods,
IP WATCHDOG (July 19, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/19/6-yearslater-effects-mayo-decision-diagnostic-methods (differentiating Mayo and its aftermath
from the precedent set in 1981 by Diamond v. Diehr and noting that in the six years
since Mayo, method patents are frequently and successfully challenged).
159. The Author still remembers her shocked reaction to the Federal Circuit’s
opinion in In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007), where the Federal
Circuit held an invention to be ineligible subject matter under § 101. Other
commentators similarly look backwards on this case. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Remembering
Nuijten and Comisky [sic] 5 Years Later, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/09/19/remembering-nuijten-and-comisky-5-years-later.
160. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 561.

2019]

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR INNOVATION

1223

requirements of patentability? What exactly is encompassed by those
judicially created exceptions: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas? Moreover, since nearly all inventions are based in some
respect on these judicially created exceptions, where is the line
between those and patent-eligible advancements?161
Part of the problem is that various courts have specifically declined
to answer these questions, leaving the doctrine undeveloped. The
Supreme Court bears the greatest responsibility for passing the buck
in these cases, as it has purposefully avoided answering the most basic
of these questions. For example, in the Alice case, the Court stated that
it “need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’
category in this case” because it was similar to the concept at issue in
Bilski.162 Given the circumstances where the Court (and nearly
everyone else) believes the doctrine to be incomprehensible and
difficult to apply, it is unthinkable for the Court to dodge the question.
Further adding to the confusion is the fact that other developed
countries, which previously held stricter limitations on what types of
inventions could be patented, are now significantly more generous on
patent-eligible subject matter than the United States.163 Because of this,
the various institutions that decide subject matter eligibility cannot draw
on the precedent from these other countries as guidance. With no
guidance from the Supreme Court on the many open questions and very
few avenues for seeking direction from elsewhere, the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter remains woefully undeveloped.
Third, the institutions that decide patent-eligible subject matter, as
well as the parties that appear before these institutions, are taking
advantage of the undeveloped law to misuse the doctrine. This misuse
of the law then leads to more confusion and continues to obfuscate,
rather than illuminate the doctrine, as is so clearly needed. The misuse
of the law comes in two main activities: claim-drafting gymnastics and
using patent law as a sword.
Claim-drafting gymnastics refers to efforts by patent attorneys to
draft claims in patent applications that will either satisfy the two-part
test for subject matter eligibility or, more preferable, avoid a subject
161. See id.
162. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014) (stating also that
“[b]oth [Alice and Bilski] are squarely within the realm of ‘abstract ideas’ as [the Court
has] used that term”).
163. See Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 957–58 (identifying inventions that
were rejected in the United States as lacking patent-eligible subject matter but allowed
in patent systems in China and the European Union).

1224

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1191

matter eligibility analysis altogether. Innovative firms are finding it
more difficult to obtain patents under the current patent-eligible
subject matter test, and thus claim drafting is becoming increasingly
expensive as patent attorneys look for strategic and creative ways to
cover the clients’ important inventions.164 But while creative claim
drafting may make for happy clients, engaging in claim-drafting
gymnastics to avoid eligibility determinations ends up harming patent
law on two fronts. First, the cleverly drafted claims may end up looking
nothing like what is traditionally expected for inventions of that type,
which defeats some of the notice functionality of patent claims.
Second, by avoiding the inquiry into patent eligibility, these claims
actually rob the doctrine of some of the nuanced analysis that is
missing at present. As long as the institutions refrain from providing
actual clarity about what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter, the
doctrine is going to be based on analogies to previously decided cases. For
inventions that a company thinks are innovative and important enough to
spend additional resources to patent (using claim-drafting gymnastics), it
would be more useful for innovation considered broadly for these
institutions to actually reason, decide, and explain subject matter eligibility.
Both institutions and parties are also using patent law, and
particularly patent-eligible subject matter, as a sword. The idea here is
that rather than viewing patent law as a means to protect innovative
technology and encourage inventive activity, patent law is being used
to thwart companies engaging in these behaviors. For example, firms
that do not rely on patent protection and instead use other firms’
innovative technology (either lawfully under license or unlawfully as
infringers) have been using patent eligible subject matter to invalidate
patents covering that technology.165 The uncertainty of the doctrine
makes it difficult for innovative firms to defend their issued patents,
164. See Gene Quinn, Why Does it Cost so Much to Prepare Patent Applications?, IP
WATCHDOG (May 7, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/05/07/why-cost-somuch-patent-application (noting part of the reason behind increased costs in patent
claim drafting is because Supreme Court precedent regarding subject matter eligibility
has resulted in patents becoming easier to challenge).
165. See, e.g., Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hosp. Prods. IP Ltd., 890 F.3d 1024,
1037 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that patents directed to methods of distributing nitric
oxide for pharmaceutical applications were not patentable because they described
procedures not functionally related to the substrate on which the printed matter was
applied); RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(finding a patent for coding and decoding image data an abstract idea rendering the
patent ineligible); In re Brown, 645 F. App’x 1014, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(holding that a method of cutting hair is not patent-eligible subject matter).
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while the reasonable chance that a patent may be invalidated makes
this option attractive to technology users. Why take a license when
there is a very good probability that the patent will be deemed invalid?
Similarly, the institutions that decide patent-eligible subject matter are
perversely using the doctrine as a trap door or an early exit, rather than a
porous filter as it was intended. That is, rather than serving as a low
threshold or gateway to other patentability inquiries, such as novelty or
non-obviousness, courts and the Patent Office are using patent-eligible
subject matter early and often to avoid having to get to the more difficult and
more resource intensive inquiries into the other patentability requirements.
Because technology users are using the doctrine as a sword to have
patents invalidated, it is common to see patent-eligible subject matter
raised early in a lawsuit—as early as a motion to dismiss before
discovery.166 The institutions, in return, are perfectly happy to end a
patent lawsuit or invalidation proceeding, at this early stage. Some
commentators laud this use, stating that patent-eligible subject matter
“serve[s] an important procedural function by providing a mechanism to
quickly and cheaply knock out patents that are plainly invalid.”167 These
frequent, and often very quick, invalidations of patents (or rejections of
patent applications) at an early stage of inquiry is also contributing to
the lack of development of the doctrine as well as the resulting chaos.
The state of the patent-eligible subject matter doctrine is unlikely to
course correct without intervention in some form because, first, it has
been developed without regard to history, purpose, or other remaining
provisions of the Patent Act and, second, because the institutions and
parties responsible are misusing the doctrine in ways that sustain its
underdeveloped nature. Put simply, without fixing patent-eligible
subject matter and the resulting chaos caused by the doctrine,
innovative firms making research and development investment
decisions may be unlikely to proceed in the shadow of this

166. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Patent
eligibility has in many cases been resolved on motions to dismiss or summary judgment.
Nothing in this decision should be viewed as casting doubt on the propriety of those
cases.”); see also Ana Friedman, Section 101 Motions to Dismiss Still Alive in District Courts, IP
WATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/14/section-101motions-dismiss (surveying recent district court decisions granting Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss under § 101).
167. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 777.
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uncertainty.168 In this environment, is it any wonder the United States
is failing on the innovation front? Something has to change.
II. REFORM EFFORTS TO FIX PATENT-ELIGIBLE
SUBJECT MATTER WILL NOT SUCCEED
Rarely has any doctrine brought together diverse stakeholders in
patent law to stand unified on any given issue. Patent-eligible subject
matter is one of those unusual times, as stakeholders of all stripes are
arguing for reform.169 A number of high profile stakeholders,
including the American Bar Association (ABA), the Intellectual
Property Owners Association (IPO), and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA), have offered various reform
proposals for patent-eligible subject matter, as have other
commentators including David Kappos, former director of the Patent
Office. While all of these groups have definitive views on how patenteligible subject matter should be fixed, very few have focused on
whether their proposals will advance innovation in a meaningful way.
More problematic is that, as noted above, successful reform requires
consideration of what institution or institutions are best situated to
develop and apply the doctrine. While these various reform efforts
have definite suggestions of how to improve patent-eligible subject
matter, none has discussed which institution should do so.
A. American Bar Association
The ABA, and specifically the Intellectual Property Law section
(ABA-IPL), submitted a letter in response to the Patent Office’s
168. See Davis, supra note 4 (sharing David Kappos’ remarks at the American Bar
Association Intellectual Property Law Conference, where Kappos stated that
companies have halted investment into medical diagnostic research and development,
and one company even removed “diagnostics” from its name to comfort investors).
169. To be fair, not everyone wants to “fix” patent-eligible subject matter. For
example, the Electronic Freedom Foundation, a notably anti-patent organization,
indicated that no changes should be made to the patent-eligible subject matter regime,
so as to eliminate vague or overbroad patents that hinder innovation. See Patents: The
Patent System is Broken, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/patents
(last visited May 20, 2019); see also Adi Kamdar et al., Defend Innovation: How to Fix Our
Broken
Patent
System,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
1
(2015),
https://www.eff.org/files/2015/02/10/eff-defend-innovation.pdf.
Similarly, the
Internet Association and the Computer and Communications Industry Association have
advocated for maintaining the status quo. See WILLIAM G. JENKS, COMMENTS OF THE
INTERNET ASSOCIATION AND THE COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
REGARDING THE LEGAL CONTOURS OF SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY (PART 2) 1, 2 (2017).
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request for comments on patent-eligible subject matter.170 The ABA is
“the largest voluntary professional association in the world” and claims
the ABA-IPL section is “the largest intellectual property law association
with approximately 20,000 members.”171 The section “advance[s] the
development of intellectual property laws, and their fair and just
administration” and claims to serve as “the forum for rich perspectives
and balanced insight on the full spectrum of IP law.”172
The ABA’s proposal begins from the premise that the Supreme
Court overreaches with its two-step test and improperly eliminates
patent protection for inventions that are practical applications of
otherwise ineligible laws of nature or abstract ideas.173 The ABA’s
proposal tries to rein in the Supreme Court, limiting ineligible subject
matter to cases where the claims would preempt other parties’ uses of
all practical applications of the particular law of nature or abstract
idea.174 Although some court opinions on patent-eligible subject
matter nod to preemption, the ABA’s proposal makes it explicit. The
ABA Resolution provides that a claim
may be denied eligibility under this section 101 on the ground that
the scope of the exclusive rights under such a claim would preempt
the use by others of all practical applications of a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea. Patent eligibility . . . shall not be negated
when a practical application of a law of nature, natural phenomenon,
or abstract idea is the subject matter of the claims upon consideration
of those claims as a whole, whereby each and every limitation of the
claims shall be fully considered and none ignored.175

The ABA’s proposal makes some positive changes to patent-eligible
subject matter. It would codify the long-standing judicially-created
exceptions for laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.

170. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, Section Chair, ABA-IPL, to the Honorable
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir. of the U.S.
Pat. & Trademark Off. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/letter5.pdf (responding to Patent Office’s invitation for written comments listed at 81 Fed.
Reg. 71485. (Oct. 17, 2016)).
171. See id.
172. See About Us, ABA-IPL, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_
property_law/about-us (last visited May 20, 2019).
173. See Letter from Donna P. Suchy, supra note 170 (arguing that recent Supreme
Court decisions have overturned the careful balance prior decisions struck “between
preventing the patenting of pure laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas
themselves, while authorizing the patenting of their application in particular fields”).
174. See id.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
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It specifically requires analysis of the invention as a whole, rather than
parsing and considering individual claim elements as either ineligible
subject matter, conventional activities, or inventive concepts.176
Finally, the ABA’s proposal moves the analysis away from importing
questions of novelty and non-obviousness into patent-eligible subject
matter, turning the inquiry on preemption instead.177 While each of
these changes would represent a shift in the right direction, many of
the same issues would still arise under the ABA’s proposed reforms,
such as what exactly constitutes an abstract idea and when and how
does estoppel apply. Additionally, the ABA’s proposal introduces a
new area of under-developed (or undeveloped) law that will simply
continue the level of confusion about the doctrine: what constitutes
and how do we assess preemption?178
B. Intellectual Property Owners Association
The IPO is “a trade association for owners of patents, trademarks,
copyrights and trade secrets” in “all industries and all fields of
technology.”179 Among their other priorities, IPO “advocates for
effective and affordable IP ownership rights.”180 Not surprisingly, IPO
is generally viewed as more pro-patent rights than the ABA-IPL, which
holds itself out as balanced.
The IPO’s proposal suggests adding additional paragraphs to § 101.
These paragraphs include a new subsection (b) which states: “A
claimed invention is ineligible . . . if and only if the claimed invention
as a whole . . . exists in nature independently of and prior to any
human activity, or exists solely in the human mind” and a new
subsection (c) which exhorts that subject matter eligibility under § 101
should be determined independent of other requirements of
patentability in §§ 102, 103, and 112.181
The IPO proposal has some features in common with the ABA
proposal discussed above. For example, it suggests that the courts
should focus on the invention as a whole, rather than dissecting it into
176. See id. at 3.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. About IPO, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/abou
t-ipo (last visited May 20, 2019).
180. Id.
181. INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 1 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.ipo.org//wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf.
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the ineligible component (the abstract idea, law of nature, or natural
phenomenon) and the rest of the claim.182 However, the IPO proposal
does not hinge its analysis on preemption. Instead, it tries to flesh out
what exactly is problematic about laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas and uses that to frame ineligible subject matter. This
makes some sense because the concern about allowing patents on laws
of nature or natural phenomena is that the invention exists without
any sort of human intervention or activity—that is, it was not truly
invented. Similarly, with respect to abstract ideas, the concern is that
a patent may cover something that is merely in the human mind—
difficult to demarcate and enforce. The comments that accompany
the IPO proposal highlight these provisions requiring some level of
human effort and an aspect of physicality,183 thus addressing the
concerns that underlie the judicially created exceptions. While it is
laudable to statutorily codify the judicial exceptions to patent-eligible
subject matter, the IPO proposal does not fully ameliorate the
confusion that abounds in this space.
C. American Intellectual Property Law Association
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) is “a
national bar association constituted primarily of lawyers in private and
corporate practice, in government service, and in the academic
community” covering all aspects of intellectual property.184 AIPLA is
“an innovator, powerful advocate, and visible global leader in
Because AIPLA represents both
intellectual property law.”185
intellectual property owners and users,186 it is generally considered
more IP-neutral than IPO, for example. AIPLA suggests that the
problem with patent-eligible subject matter determinations is with the
“unnecessary and overreaching” judicially-created exceptions to the
plain language of § 101.187

182. See id.
183. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 563.
184. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2017) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT],
https://www.aipla.org/docs/default-source/annual-reports/aipla_annualreport-2016_17.pdf.
185. Who We Are, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, https://www.aipla.org/about/about-us
(last visited May 20, 2019).
186. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 184.
187. See Letter from Mark L. Whitaker, President, Am. Intell. Prop. L. Ass’n to the Honorable
Michelle K. Lee, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intell. Prop. & Dir. of the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/comments_aipla_jan182017.pdf.
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In May 2018, AIPLA and IPO united to issue a joint proposal on
patent-eligible subject matter.188 The joint proposal retains the
original text of § 101, indicates that the sole exceptions to patenteligible subject matter are if the invention exists in nature independent
of human activity or is performed solely in the human mind, and then
it tries to shift patent-eligible subject matter away from the other
requirements of patentability, but noting that eligibility should not be
based on other statutory sections (i.e., §§ 102, 103, and 112) or
whether there is an inventive concept.189 For all of the reasons discussed
above for the separate proposals, this joint proposal is also problematic.
D. Other Proposals
Other commentators have suggested patent-eligible subject matter
in the United States be harmonized with other major patent systems,
such as the European Patent Convention. The European Patent
Convention includes a laundry list of patent eligible and ineligible
inventions.190 While an enumerated list like this would offer a greater
degree of certainty, it would require regular updating and may not
adequately protect new and emerging technology.191 For example,
Paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the European Patent Convention states
that “(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes, rules and methods for performing
mental acts, playing games or doing business, and programs for
computers; [and] (d) presentations of information” “shall not be
regarded as inventions.”192
Paragraph 3, however, notes that
“Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or
activities referred to therein only to the extent to which a . . . patent
application or . . . patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as
such.”193 Similar proposals include a technological arts test, which
would ask whether the claimed invention contributes to the

188. See Joint AIPLA-IPO Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AM. INTELL. PROP. L (last visited
May 20, 2019).
189. See id.
190. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065
U.N.T.S. 254, http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/029F2D
A107DD667FC125825F005311DA/$File/EPC_16th_edition_2016_en.pdf
[hereinafter European Patent Convention].
191. See, e.g., Taylor, Amending Patent Eligibility, supra note 11, at 2198–201.
192. See European Patent Convention, supra note 190, art. 52(2).
193. See id. art. 52(3).
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technological arts, solves a technological problem, or otherwise falls
within the technological arts.194
Influential individuals in the patent field have also offered more
radical suggestions to reform patent-eligible subject matter. For
example, David Kappos, former director of the Patent Office from 2009–
2013, has argued for a different type of reform, suggesting that § 101
simply be abolished: “It’s time to abolish Section 101, and the reason I
say that is that Europe doesn’t have 101 and Asia doesn’t have 101 and
they seem to be doing just fine in constraining patent-eligible subject
matter.”195 Robert Sachs, original author of the Bilski Blog and longtime Silicon Valley patent attorney, has similarly argued for abolishing
§ 101, or in the alternative only considering patent-eligible subject
matter after the other patentability requirements have been met.196
Alternatively, Kappos and other intellectual property heavy-hitters
have suggested Congress should step in to fix the “total chaos” caused
by the Supreme Court’s patent-eligible subject matter cases.197 However,
a congressional solution that enumerates patent-eligible (or patentineligible) inventions is likely to be fraught with constant suggestions for
amendments to add or subtract from the list,198 similar to the problem
identified above with respect to the European Patent Convention’s list
of non-inventions. Although it would be difficult to design a legislative
solution that appeases the variety of stakeholders involved, Kappos
suggests that this would still be better than the current situation.199
None of the proposals described above will solve the problem of
patent-eligible subject matter. Some suggestions fail to address already
known areas of confusion in the existing law. For example, some of
the proposals leave the judicially created exceptions of abstract ideas,
laws of nature, and natural phenomena intact or try to codify these
194. See Lefstin et al., supra note 90, at 564–65.
195. Davis, supra note 7.
196. See Robert Sachs, Twenty-Two Ways Congress Can save Section 101, BILSKI BLOG
(Feb. 12, 2015), www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/02/twenty-two-ways-congress-cansave-section-101.html. Sachs also has advocated for a return to the useful, concrete,
and tangible result test instituted by the Federal Circuit in the late 1990s. Id.
197. See Davis, supra note 4. Kappos argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions “lack
clear guidelines,” necessitating a legislative solution. Id. Marian Underweiser, IBM
Corp.’s senior counsel for intellectual property law, policy, and strategy, suggested that
Congress may need to step in “[i]f we’ve decided the case law is not going anywhere and
we can’t wait for the Supreme Court to fix it, yes, we’re going to have to go to
Congress . . . [m]any of us have reached the conclusion that we have no choice.” Id.
198. See id. (paraphrasing Robert Armitage, former Eli Lilly & Co. general counsel).
199. See id.
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exceptions in other, but not more definitive, language, like “existing in
nature” or existing “solely in the human mind.” These proposals fail to
flesh out questions about what these terms mean and where the line is,
for example, between an ineligible abstract idea and an eligible
invention that includes an abstract idea. Other proposals introduce new
areas of confusion, such as introducing the notion of “preemption.”
All of these proposals are based on the notion that Congress must
step in to fix patent-eligible subject matter. Even if Congress had the
appetite to do so, which is never a guarantee with all of its other
concerns, none of these proposals enacted by Congress would yield a
complete solution to the problem of patent-eligible subject matter. A
great number of questions would still exist after any of these proposals
were adopted and none of the proposals suggest how these questions
might be answered. Without addressing this issue, and specifically which
institution or institutions might be the correct one to fully develop the
doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter, no proposal is actually going
to fix the mess. This Article seeks to provide a complete answer.
III. A RADICAL SOLUTION: TAKE PATENT ELIGIBLE
SUBJECT MATTER AWAY FROM THE PATENT OFFICE
The doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter is clearly a mess.
Multiple institutions make decisions about subject matter eligibility at
a variety of different stages during a patent’s life. The situation is
complex, and unfortunately, rather than solving the problem, most of
the proposed solutions to fix patent-eligible subject matter are simply
restatements of the current test or, perhaps worse, add additional
terms and concepts that no one understands. To overcome what seems
like an intractable problem, it is time to propose a radical solution.
This Article proposes that patent-eligible subject matter
determinations should not be undertaken by the Patent Office.200 To
state this proposition more clearly, before a patent is issued, the
question of patent-eligible subject matter should not be considered by
the examiner or the PTAB—a patent should be granted so long as it
meets the other requirements of patentability, including utility,
novelty, non-obviousness, and adequate disclosure. After a patent is
issued, patent-eligible subject matter should not be the basis for any
200. For an entirely contrary viewpoint on this matter, see John M. Golden,
Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1041 (2011)
(arguing that patent-eligible subject matter decisions should be “primarily entrusted
to the [Patent Office], rather than, as it is now, to the courts”).
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post-grant review. Instead, to the extent that patent-eligible subject
matter is at issue, the question must be taken to the courts.
Although this proposal may seem backwards, there are principles in
both institutional design and administrative law that support it. More
importantly, there are a number of significant advantages that could
be realized if the courts, and not the Patent Office, are deciding patenteligible subject matter. Additionally, recent comments given by the
Director Iancu,201 demonstrate that this proposal could be fairly easily
implemented. Each of these topics—institutional design bases,
administrative law support, ancillary benefits, and operationalization
of this proposal—are discussed below.
A. Institutional Design
Institutional design, broadly, is a framework for understanding
institutions and the roles they play.202 Like most aspects of the legal
system, the institutional design surrounding patent-eligible subject
matter arose in a rather ad hoc fashion, as the courts and the Patent
Office took the lead in various respects with respect to the doctrine.203
However, in focusing on successful reform, it makes sense to consider
institutional design principles and whether the system is meeting its
goals in the face of the variety of inputs.204 This section first discusses
goals for the patent system in analyzing patent-eligible subject matter
and then considers a variety of metrics to assess what institution or
institutions would be best suited to achieve the goals described.
1.

Goals for a patent-eligible subject matter system
To determine which institution or institutions are best suited for any
particular purpose, it is important to specify some sort of baseline or

201. See infra notes 303–06 (detailing Director Iancu’s remarks at the Intellectual
Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting).
202. See, e.g., Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 2 (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).
203. See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Defending Breakthrough Innovation: The History and
Future of State Patent Law, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2016); see also William Lucy,
Persons in Law, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 787, 788 (2009) (“In common law (and
perhaps other) legal systems, features of institutional design are just as likely to have
evolved piecemeal as to be the products of advanced planning.”).
204. See Laura K. Abel, The Role of Speech Regarding Constraints on Attorney Performance:
An Institutional Design Analysis, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 185 (2012) (citing
Goodin, supra note 202).
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goal.205 Because the patent system exists to promote the “Progress of
Science and the useful Arts,”206 i.e., promote innovation, the normative
goal for the patent system, and particularly patent eligibility, must be
innovation.207 Or, more specific to this Article, what institution can
best address patent-eligible subject matter to promote or increase
innovation? Technological innovation, the type of innovation at the
heart of the patent system involves the invention of a new product or
process, as well as “putting the invention into productive use.”208 It is
this second step, putting the invention to productive use, which leads
to societally desired long-term improvements in growth and well-being
across a wide range of metrics, including economic growth.209
Innovation policy would involve the preferencing of systems and rules
that encourage the development and deployment of technological
inventions to the benefit of society.210
While defining innovation may be complicated, a more difficult
question may be how we measure innovation. Measuring long-term
improvements in growth and well-being is not an easy task. Even
measuring the amount of development and deployment of
technological inventions is tricky, especially because innovation is
often a time-consuming endeavor and because inventions often build
upon earlier inventions that were helpful to advance the technology
but may not have been readily or successfully deployed.211 In the
absence of a concrete measure of innovation, another angle would be
to look at what types of things help or hinder innovation. For example,
if patents are intended to incentivize innovation, patent policy must

205. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 48–50 (1991) (arguing that institutional analysis must start
from a normative baseline).
206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
207. See I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x 982, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (“[T]he constitutional grant of authority ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts’ . . . ‘is both a grant of power and a limitation’ . . . Section 101’s
vital role . . . is to insure that patent protection promotes, rather than impedes,
scientific progress and technological innovation.” (internal citations omitted)).
208. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008).
209. See id. (“A major goal of any society should be to increase people’s well-being
or welfare, broadly defined.”).
210. See id. at 9.
211. See id. at 10–11.
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pay attention to the “ever-shifting reality of the scientific and technical
challenges faced by innovators.”212
It would be ideal if there were concrete, agreed-upon goals by which to
assess institutional designs for patent-eligible subject matter. Given the
complexities of patent law generally, and the convolution of the various
institutions that administer patent law, it is surprising that aspects of
institutional design are not more frequently discussed by patent law
scholars. The institutional design of the Federal Circuit has been
examined,213 as has the deference between the Patent Office and the Federal
Circuit.214 However, the literature does not fully explore the relationship
between the various institutions concerning broader legal issues.215
The goals for “fixing” patent-eligible subject matter have,
unfortunately, not been clearly elucidated. Certainly, having a test that
is not regularly denounced for its difficulty to apply would be a good
starting point, but does that necessarily incentivize innovation? The
statutory categories—processes, machines, manufactures, and
compositions of matter—are probably helpful because they set
patentable inventions apart from creations that do not qualify for
patents, such as copyrighted works or trademarks. The judicially
created exceptions—law of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
idea—are also probably useful, because patents on gravity, elm trees,
or long division would not enhance innovation.
What else can be said about patent-eligible subject matter as far as it
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts? This Article
suggests three primary goals to promote innovation, each focusing on
different stakeholders within the patent ecosystem. First, innovative
companies need to be able to obtain reliable and effective patent rights

212. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2003).
213. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment
in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 797–98 (2004) (noting the tension
between having a specialized appellate bench and the degree of fact-finding deference
owed in each particular case); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114–
17 (2004) (concluding that the Federal Circuit has successfully manifested Congress’s
desire for a central manager for patent law).
214. See generally Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1959–60 (2013).
215. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 80, at 385 (noting that “the existing literature
does not fully explore how the institutional design of the [Patent Office] and its
relationship with the Federal Circuit affect the Agency’s official positions on
substantive law”).
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for their inventions. Second, the public needs to have access to the
goods made possible when these companies commercialize these
inventions.
Third, future innovators need to have access to
technological information made public through available goods and
patent disclosures. With these three goals in mind, we can start to
consider what institution or institutions may be best to assess patenteligible subject matter.
2.

Metrics for assessing institutional design
To promote innovation, the baseline goals of a system for patenteligible subject matter may include (1) providing reliable and effective
patent rights, (2) encouraging commercialization of inventions, and
(3) fostering disclosure of technological information via the market
and the patent system. Institutional design would thus consider which
institution or institutions would make it more likely that these goals
are achieved. Although there are a number of metrics that could be
used to assess an institution’s abilities, this Article focuses on four
particular metrics: competencies, priorities, redundancies, and trust
and respect. Based on these metrics, a strong case emerges that, to
promote the goals associated with innovation as described above,
patent-eligible subject matter decisions are best left to the courts.
a. Competencies
To determine which institutions are best suited for any given task, it
is important to look at each institution’s strengths, as well as the tasks
we are seeking it to perform. The unique strength of the Patent Office
is technological knowledge. As noted above, the examining corps is
composed of scientists and engineers trained in patent law.216 The
PTAB is comprised of lawyers, many of whom were also trained in
science or engineering.217 PTAB judges are also generally considered
experts in patent law.218 Structural features of the Patent Office reflect
and emphasize the technological focus of that institution, including
the Patent Office’s organization by technology type (technical art
units),219 an elaborate classification scheme, which sorts documents by
216. See ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS, supra note 77.
217. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“The administrative patent judges shall be persons of
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”).
218. See Michael Goodman, What’s So Special About Patent Law?, 26 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 797, 842 (2016).
219. See Patent Technology Centers Management, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology-centers-
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technical field,220 and the requirement of technical training for
attorneys who are admitted to the Patent Bar, allowing them to
correspond with the Patent Office.221
On the other hand, the courts are generally staffed by lawyers
trained in law, most of whom are not trained in science or engineering.
Some judges, particularly those at the Federal Circuit and district
courts that see a lot of patent cases, purposefully hire clerks that are
trained in science or engineering. Additionally, judges may have access
to special masters or other expert sources with scientific backgrounds.
While not scientists, judges are, however, experts in law and policy.
Given these areas of strength, it then becomes a question of what we
are asking that institution to do. Many inquiries in patent law are
driven by questions of fact or are mixed questions of law and fact.
Factual issues in patent law are where the strengths of the Patent Office
are critical. Take, for example, the fact question of novelty.222
Determining whether a claimed invention is the same as a technology
described in the prior art, such as in a previously published journal
article, often requires an understanding of the technology involved.
Questions of law based on underlying facts also tend to require
technological inquiries.223

management (last visited May 20, 2019) (outlining the organizational structure of
USPTO’s patent management system).
220. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. PATENT CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM (USPC) I-1 (2012), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/resour
ces/classification/overview.pdf (“The USPC is a system for organizing all U.S. patent
documents and many other technical documents into relatively small collections based
on common subject matter.”).
221. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO
THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf (“An applicant applying for the examination must
demonstrate . . . that he or she possesses the scientific and technical training necessary
to provide valuable service to patent applicants.”).
222. See, e.g., Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit:
Substance and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 361–62 app. A (2002) (citing Glaverbel
Societé Anonymé & Fosbel, Inc. v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550, 1554
(Fed. Cir. 1995)) (“Whether an invention meets the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 is a question of fact reviewed for clear error or substantial evidence.”).
223. For example, consider the inquiry into non-obviousness. See id. at 363–64
(highlighting the fact questions that underlie the determination of non-obviousness).
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Patent-eligible subject matter was long thought to be a pure question
of law,224 which in part led to its rather enthusiastic use for invalidating
patents.225 As a question of law, this task may fall more squarely in the
competencies of the courts than the Patent Office. Recently, however,
the Federal Circuit changed its stance on this long-held understanding
that patent-eligible subject matter is a pure question of law. In
Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,226 decided on February 8, 2018, the court
acknowledged that patent eligibility “is a question of law which may
contain disputes over underlying facts.”227 However, the underlying
fact questions are not the essence of the patent-eligible subject matter
inquiry. Instead, these fact questions go to the second prong of the
Alice test: “Whether something is well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a factual
determination.”228 While some commentators herald this opinion as
making patent invalidation, especially at the early stage of litigation,
more difficult,229 it does not change the fact that many patent-eligible
subject matter decisions are generally driven by law, policy and
preference choices, not the factual inquiry regarding the presence of
routine or conventional technology.
Even with the recent introduction (or acknowledgement, at least) of
a factual component of patent-eligible subject matter inquiries, it is
true that not all facts are created equal. Some facts are “adjudicative
facts” in that they “help the decision-maker establish what happened
at a particular time and place.”230 Other facts are “legislative facts” that
“help a decision-maker decide questions of law and policy.”231 Most
questions related to patentability are adjudicative facts—facts where

224. See id. at 361 app. A (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc. 172 F.3d 1352,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[S]tatutory subject matter under [§ 101] is a question of law
reviewed de novo.”).
225. See supra Section I.C.
226. 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
227. See id. at 1368.
228. See id. at 1369.
229. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Berkheimer v. HP: Federal Circuit Says Patent Eligibility a Factual
Determination Inappropriate for Summary Judgment, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2018),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/16/berkheimer-hp-eligibility-factual-determination
(“Berkheimer is also equally important . . . because it stands for the proposition that
questions of fact can and do underline patent eligibility determinations. This is
important . . . because it will make summary judgment more difficult for infringers . . . .”).
230. Golden, supra note 200, at 1055 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 3.6.1 (3d ed. 1999)).
231. Id.
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the law will depend on questions of science or technology.232 Patenteligible subject matter, on the other hand, is nearly all legislative fact.233
At bottom, the real questions and open issues behind patent-eligible
subject matter are questions of law and policy—what exactly is meant
by the statutory categories, the judicially-created exceptions, and
where the lines are drawn between them. While inquiries regarding
science and technology are squarely within the wheelhouse of the
Patent Office, matters of law and policy remain the forte of the courts.
The questions that exist about patent-eligible subject matter are
generally related to two themes—what exactly are the judicially created
exceptions and what is the difference between an application of these
exceptions and a claim directed to the exception itself. The first
question would seem to be a matter of law—and specifically, statutory
interpretation, a particular competency for courts. Moreover, the
courts are the instigators of the exceptions in the first place; the courts
are the correct institution to tell us what they meant. The second
question would seem to be a matter of law and policy—how to best
interpret § 101 to effectuate the constitutional requirement of
promoting innovation. Courts regularly have to interpret statutes to
satisfy constitutional provisions. As noted above, this requires that
patent-eligible subject matter focus on effective and reliable patent
rights, commercialization of technology, and disclosure in the form of
goods and patent documents. None of these issues is squarely based in
technology; rather, they are more general questions of law and policy.
While questions of law are best resolved by courts, to the extent that
patent-eligible subject matter is also a matter of policy, there can still
be disagreement over which institution is best suited for addressing the
question. Some scholars have argued that the Patent Office may have
particular policy-making strengths over the courts. For example, Arti
Rai points out that the Patent Office, in regulating ex ante, may be
better able to keep a rein on expanding patent rights.234 This begs the
question, in the instant case, of whether reining in expanded patent
rights using patent-eligible subject matter promotes innovation. Given
232. See id. at 1055–56 (“Inquiries into novelty and nonobviousness typically require
painstaking review of prior-art materials that are specifically related to the claimed invention.”).
233. See id. at 1058 (“[S]ubject-matter eligibility does not require anything
distinctive or specific to the claimed invention. Instead, subject-matter eligibility
requires that the claimed invention belong to one or more broadly drawn categories
of things deemed potentially patentable.”).
234. See Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1264–65 (2012).
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the current state of affairs, it seems the opposite is true, as the
overzealous use of patent-eligible subject matter to quash patent
applications and issued patents is harming innovation. Jonathan
Masur argues that the Patent Office has expertise and institutional
resources that the federal courts simply do not have, including
“enormous quantities of useful information” that the Patent Office
produces.235 As interesting and wide-ranging as this data is, it is not
clear that it is directly related to innovation policy. In fact, although
the Patent Office has, as Masur points out, lots of data, unlike other
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, the Patent Office does not
have a rich tradition of economic analysis.236 This has been changing,
however, and the Office of the Chief Economist at the Patent Office
has been doing much good work.237 It is not clear, however, that this
data is designed to uncover policy regarding innovation with respect
to patent eligibility. Finally, Michael Burstein argues that greater
policy decision making by the Patent Office could avoid piecemeal
decision-making.238 In the current instance, however, patent-eligible
subject matter as done by the Patent Office is occurring piecemeal and
is adding to the bulk of confusion surrounding the doctrine. Thus,
although it seems to make sense to argue that this criterion weighs in
favor of the Patent Office having the most apt competency, the facts
may not be true in application.
Further, the open issues of patent-eligible subject matter are mixed
questions of law and policy. While the modern administrative state
contemplates specifically that policymaking should be placed in the hands
of agencies,239 the open questions of law compel the decision to be
removed from agency determinations and left instead with the institutions
that are best suited to interpret the law. As discussed below, the unlimited
breadth of the statute and the fact that there has been no additional
guidance about how the law should be understood or interpreted actually
weighs against giving the issue to an agency to flesh out.

235. Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 275, 279
(Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 2011).
236. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1126.
237. A variety of publications and datasets can be found on the Patent Office’s website on
the Office of the Chief Economist’s page. See Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-andinternational-affairs/office-chief-economist (last visited May 20, 2019).
238. Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2011).
239. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1131.
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Even assuming arguendo that patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of science and technology instead of law and policy, it is not clear that
the Patent Office is the best institution to develop its contours. The
argument that patent examiners are better suited because of their
technical expertise may also be an overstatement. First, there is no
requirement that patent examiners remain current in their area of
technology. Second, even if an examiner has an advanced degree in a
particular field, that examiner will be examining patent applications
that fall outside of his area of expertise. The more education an
examiner has, the more likely it is that he will handle patent
applications outside of his strengths, albeit in the same technology
field; perhaps the less-educated, newest examiners are the best
technically suited to examine patent applications, but does that make
them good at law and policy? Furthermore, particularly for the types
of patent applications that fall within the abstract idea section, these
are often business methods; but business methods is not a college
degree. The examiners that work in any given technology area have
varied backgrounds that may defeat the very idea of technical expertise
that would make the Patent Office the best arbiter of technology
questions. No matter what their scientific expertise, there is no
argument that patent examiners would be the best institution to flesh
out open areas of law and policy.
One solution, that would seem to get “the best of both worlds,”
would be to remove the patent examining corps and leave
development of patent-eligible subject matter to the PTAB. After all,
as a body of administrative law judges with training in both science and
engineering, as well as law, perhaps they would be best suited to work
with both the technological and legal nuances required to develop the
doctrine. However, one recent study by Gene Quinn indicates that
administrative patent judges may not be terribly experienced in either
realm. For example, the median number of years of experience at the
time of appointment for a PTAB judge was eleven years of experience,
with an average of 13.04 years.240 This pales in comparison to federal
district court judges (selected from primary patent courts in the
United States), who had a median of twenty-three years of experience,
and average of 23.38 years of experience, before being appointed to
the bench.241 More striking, however, than the difference in the
median and average years of experience is just how little experience
240. See Quinn, supra note 97.
241. See id.
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some of the PTAB judges had; some were appointed to the PTAB with
less than five years of experience.242 Given the typical time to make
partner in a law firm is ten years, nearly half of PTAB judges were
appointed while they were at best senior associates.243 As Quinn notes,
“[t]he experience level of the PTAB as a whole is shockingly low in
comparison to federal district court judges, and the Secretary of
Commerce is appointing individuals who could never win
confirmation in the United States Senate to be a district court judge”
and yet gives these administrative law judges extraordinary power.244
Because PTAB judges are potentially not experts in science and
technology and are also not experts in law or policy, it would seem they
would be the least well-suited to develop the doctrine of patent-eligible
subject matter, whether that issue is classified as a technical issue or,
more correctly, as a matter of law and policy.
For these reasons, this Article suggests that the courts may be the
more competent institution to carry out the task of fixing patenteligible subject matter. This Article is not the first to suggest that the
Federal Circuit is best suited to handle patent policy.245 After all,
interpreting law to suit constitutional requirements is what courts do
every day. Additionally, the courts are responsible for crafting the
judicially created exceptions, as well as the mess that resulted from the
incomplete development of the law surrounding these exceptions.

242. See id. Quinn found 12.64% of PTAB judges were appointed five years or less
removed from graduating law school, 7.47% had less than four years of experience,
and some were appointed with as little as two years of experience. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. The Chief Judge of the PTAB, David Ruschke, responded to Quinn’s study:
The USPTO has full confidence in the legal and technical capabilities of each
Administrative Patent Judge (APJ) appointed to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB). All of our judges have specialized technical degrees combined
with extensive legal and technical experience, including that gained over
many years in private practice, industry, and/or government. The judges
clearly possess the required professional and technical qualifications needed
to conduct Board proceedings of any type and to issue decisions addressing all
issues that come before the Board.
See Gene Quinn, PTAB Chief Judge Defends APJs as Having Extensive Legal Experience, IP
WATCHDOG (Mar. 8, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/08/ptab-chiefjudge-defends. Quinn renews and clarifies his study in response to this quote in the same
post, arguing that even giving these administrative law judges credit for their time as
examiners at the Patent Office or other government service, they still lack any sort of
legal experience as would be expected by a person in charge of adjudication. See id.
245. See Burstein, supra note 238, at 1757 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has become the
most important expositor of the substantive law of patents in the United States.”).
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Even if the courts had not created these exceptions, the open issues for
patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law and policy, not science
or technology. Understanding and interpreting law, and the related
policy issues, is what courts were designed to do. In addition to fitting
squarely within courts’ areas of expertise, there are ancillary benefits to
lodging these decisions with the courts; these benefits are described below.
There are, of course, objections to the courts deciding patenteligible subject matter beyond the question of their specific
competencies. Specifically, concerns have been raised about courts’
abilities to address broad issues of innovation policy, timeliness of
decision-making, lack of flexibility, and application of stare decisis
yielding a “substantially incoherent body of precedent.”246 However,
courts are addressing patent law issues germane to innovation policy
all the time. The backlog of the Patent Office, both in terms of the
examining corps and the PTAB, means that the Patent Office is rarely
much quicker than the courts. And finally, the courts have exhibited
as much flexibility and incoherence as the Patent Office on the issue
thus far, giving neither institution the edge as far as patent-eligible
subject matter doctrine. These concerns, to the extent valid, do not
override the benefits of having courts define the outstanding legal contours
of patent-eligible subject matter. As far as competencies, the courts seem
to be in a better position to determine patent-eligible subject matter.
b. Priorities
Another facet to be considered when looking at institutional design
is priorities of each institution. In particular, it should be asked which
institution’s priorities are most in line with the task at hand. The task,
of course, is developing patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence to
best promote innovation (or the progress of science and technology).
The priorities of the Patent Office and the courts are, not surprisingly,
different from each other.
The Patent Office, according to its mission statement, is to issue valid
patents. Specifically, the Patent Office strives to:
Foster[] innovation, competitiveness and economic growth,
domestically and abroad by delivering high quality and timely
examination of patent . . . applications, guiding domestic and
international intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual

246. These four points come from John Golden’s article. See Golden, supra note
200, at 1075.
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property information and education worldwide, with a highlyskilled, diverse workforce.247

Although the Patent Office mission statement pays lip service to
innovation and policy—and even includes these terms in its mission
statement—its key priority is examining patent applications and
issuing patents. This is evidenced by the metrics the Patent Office uses
to illustrate its annual activities—including number of applications
examined, number of patents issued, number of employees engaged
in such activities, and so on. For many years, patent examiners worked
on a system of points based on “counts” earned for issuing office
actions and disposing of patent applications.248 Examiners had to earn
a certain number of counts and bonus awards were based on counts as
well.249 The count system for measuring patent examiner performance
has been modified in the last decade, but the focus is still on patent
examiners processing patent applications.250 While certain offices
within the Patent Office are engaged in policy activities, it is not the
bread and butter of the agency.
Courts, on the other hand, are focused on settling disputes under
law and clearing their dockets. In doing so, courts strive to preserve
“core values” such as the rule of law, which involves ensuring
predictability, coherence, and transparency of process, as well as
judicial independence and adaptability to changing national and local
needs.251 Courts have long interpreted law based on policy through
case decisions and, in fact, patent-eligible subject matter jurisprudence
has much of its background from the courts, including the
development of the judicially created exceptions.
There are two reasons why the priorities of the courts may cut against
choosing courts as the best institution for developing patent-eligible

247. See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., USPTO 2014–2018 STRATEGIC PLAN 2
(2014), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTO_2014-2018_
Strategic_Plan.pdf.
248. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1549–50 (2009).
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Force Proposes Significant
Changes to Examiner Count System (Sept. 30, 2009), https://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/news-updates/uspto-joint-labor-management-task-force-proposes-significantchanges-examine-0 (noting that a key goal of the 2009 modifications to the count
system was to “[e]ncourage examiners to identify allowable subject matter earlier in
the examination process”).
251. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2 (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/strategic-plan-federal-judiciary.
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subject matter—case selection and coherency. Case selection is often
deemed a limitation for courts in clarifying law. Specifically, courts
may only shape law and policy through the cases that are brought
before them, and these cases may not present a complete picture of
the issues that need to be decided.252 Further, the perspectives heard
by the courts are generally only the litigating parties, who do not have
the incentives to present all relevant arguments.253 Finally, the court
system does not have the resources to fully evaluate complex economic
policy, which is critical for promoting innovation.254 However, these
same criticisms are true of the Patent Office as well, because most of
the effective patent-eligible subject matter doctrine created via PTAB
cases suffers from similar selection problems.
As law and policy develops, courts, at least occasionally, also suffer
from lack of coherency. In order for patent-eligible subject matter to
develop into a pro-innovation doctrine, there must be some certainty
and predictability provided by its application. In this case, it is actually
a positive that the courts do focus on rule of law. Consistent,
transparent inquiries into subject matter eligibility would provide a
valuable tool in developing the doctrine in a meaningful way.255 Courts
are actually better suited to developing law policy in this respect than
the Patent Office, because stare decisis is not in play and many Patent
Office decisions (particularly those of the Patent Office examining
corps) are not transparent.
Ultimately, what is required to achieve reliable and effective patent
rights, encourage commercialization, and foster disclosure of
technological information is for some institution to develop a common
law of subject matter eligibility. After all, if Congress does not amend
the statute, or even if it does, there will remain many open areas within
the law that will need to be answered via analogy to the technology
described in other patent applications and patents. Deciding these cases
252. See Rai, supra note 212, at 1122–23.
253. See id. at 1123.
254. See id.
255. Chief Judge Leonard Stark of the District of Delaware recently had a “Section
101 Day,” where he rapidly addressed patent-eligible subject matter claims in seven cases
in one day. See Matthew Bultman, ‘Section 101 Day’ Yields Quick Ruling on Patent Eligibility,
LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1133434. Judge
Stark arrived at the idea because he “had a lot of Section 101 motions” on his docket and
he thought “perhaps there may be some efficiencies to be gained by doing something
like this experiment” See id. Although it does not necessarily evidence a careful and
consistent inquiry by a court, it certainly demonstrates that courts are willing to
experiment to arrive at a better way to deal with complicated doctrine.
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in a way that preserves and enhances the “core values” of the rule of law
by developing a predictable and coherent jurisprudence of patenteligible subject matter is clearly within the priorities of the courts.
c.

Redundancy

Another facet to consider when selecting the best institution for a
task is redundancy. Redundancies are not themselves a problem; too
much redundancy is. When patent-eligible subject matter decisions
begin in the Patent Office, they are entitled to three separate layers of
appeal as of right.256 On the other hand, when patent eligibility is raised
in the district court, there is only one layer of appeal available as of right.
By lodging patent eligibility decisions in the courts, rather than the
Patent Office, the layers of redundancy are reduced, but not eliminated.
In addition to the extra layers of redundancy associated with the
Patent Office deciding patent-eligible subject matter, there is also the
fact that many of these redundant determinations will cause a delay in
the issuance of the patent. For example, if an examiner determines a
patent application claims ineligible subject matter, the applicant can
appeal to the PTAB. If still unsatisfied with the PTAB’s determination,
the applicant can appeal to the court. This is potentially three levels
of decision-making that occur before a patent can be issued. This
redundancy has a negative impact on the patentee, because
enforceable patent rights extend from the date a patent issues until
twenty years from the date of filing.257 The longer a patent application
spends in prosecution, meaning the period of give-and-take between
the applicant and the examiner, the shorter the effective life of that
patent. When a patent application is rejected by the Patent Office and
then that rejection is appealed to the PTAB, any patent that issues will
have an even shorter effective life. Particularly in the area of business
methods (a sub-set of computer technology), appeals are taking a very
long time.258 The business-method art unit of the Patent Office had
over double the number of appeals filed than other comparable
256. See supra notes 136–39 (discussing the different stages at which a patent’s
eligibility is assessed and can be appealed).
257. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating a patent’s term shall “begin[ ] on the
date on which the patent issues and end[ ] 20 years from the date on which the
application for the patent was filed in the United States” or, if referencing an earlier
filed application, from the earliest date).
258. See, e.g., Samuel Hayim & Kate Gaudry, PTAB is Bogged down by Eligibility Appeals,
IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/03/05/ptabbogged-eligibility-appeals.
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technologies, but significantly fewer appellate decisions rendered.259
This is due in part to the business-method art unit having a significantly
greater backlog of unprocessed, or pending, appeals.260 Not only do
these additional layers of redundancy (and associated delay) harm
individual patent applicants, they also harm the patent system as a
whole because it may hinder commercialization and disclosure of
technological information.
By vesting patent-eligible subject matter decisions in the courts,
there would be less redundancy and patents should issue more quickly,
incentivizing companies to commercialize the technology and bring
products to market, as well as disclosing technological information in
the form of both patent documents and marketed products. The
flipside, however, is that an ultimate decision on patent eligibility may
come later, after a company has already commercialized and marketed
a product. While this may have negative impact on the company whose
patent is invalidated at this later date, innovation more broadly would
benefit from the marketed product.
The right amount of redundancy cannot just focus on how quickly
final decisions are rendered. There should also be a sense of
uniformity. There are multiple dimensions of uniformity, both of
which may be better served by the courts rather than the Patent Office.
One dimension of uniformity is the idea of “legal uniformity,” meaning
that the rights in question should be applied consistently throughout
the entire system.261 A second dimension of uniformity is “adjudicative
uniformity,” meaning that the claims of a particular patent should be
construed similarly, regardless of the institution reviewing them.262
Neither of these concepts of uniformity are enhanced by the current
system of allowing both the Patent Office and the courts to opine on
patent-eligible subject matter. While perhaps none of the institutions
that decide patent-eligible subject matter has a particular upper hand
when it comes to uniformity, especially given the last decade’s worth
of opinions and decisions on the subject, the court system’s expressed
desire to develop predictability and coherence through law demonstrates
that the courts could create uniformity, if given the right incentives.
Limiting patent-eligible subject matter inquiries to the courts would
permit sufficient redundancy to allow errors to be corrected, by appeal

259.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
See id.
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 21 (2014).
See id.
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to the Federal Circuit. However, it would remove the excess
redundancies that cut into the effective life of a patent and hinder the
development of guidance on these issues, as well as limit the ways in
which uniformity can be undermined. This in turn should have a
positive aspect on innovation.
d. Trust and respect
Last, but certainly not least, an institution chosen for any given task
must possess sufficient trust and respect from constituents to fulfill its
duties. On the issue of patent-eligible subject matter, many people
have expressed lack of faith in both the Patent Office and the courts.
Courts have not been seen in especially positive light, particularly with
respect to their patent-eligible subject matter decisions; however, if
possible, the Patent Office’s reputation is even worse. The lack of trust
and respect afforded to these institutions can be grouped into two primary
categories: the institution’s respect for the subject and the likelihood the
institution will be subject to capture. In both categories, the lack of trust
and respect for the Patent Office is greater than for the courts.
First, for an institution to be afforded the trust and respect necessary
to fully develop an area of law, as is necessary to fix patent-eligible
subject matter, that institution must first have respect for the subject it
is speaking on—in this case, patent law. To be fair, courts are not
always the best guardians of patent law, but often when a court raises
concerns about the value and purpose of patent law, it is either because
the judge does not understand the patent system or because the litigants
appearing before the court make respect for the patent system an issue in
a case. The Patent Office (and especially the PTAB), on the other hand,
have shown disrespect for the very system it was created to execute.
Rather than implementing an institution that supports the patent
system, the Patent Office instead has engaged in behavior that
demonstrates a significant lack of care for patent law. Commentators
have noted that PTAB decisions on a number of issues have been
inconsistent,263 and this is true for patent-eligible subject matter as well.
Decisions from elsewhere in the Patent Office, including the
examining corps, are similarly all over the board. The lack of
consistency is, of course, concerning, but even more troubling is that
the PTAB’s jurisprudence on patent-eligible subject matter is

263. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 103, at 1589 (referencing “complaints by
the patent bar” due to inconsistencies among PTAB decisions).
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sometimes provided with very little explanation.264 Rather than being
able to rely on substantive reasons for why an invention is or is not
eligible for patenting, the developing jurisprudence provides only
examples—this invention passes muster, these do not.265 This does not
demonstrate a concern or respect for patent law and instead may lead
applicants and others to distrust the Patent Office as an institution to
develop patent law.
Moreover, as noted above, respect for the Patent Office has been
harmed by the PTAB’s reputation as a “killing field” or “death squad”
for patents.266 The Patent Office obviously serves as the initial hurdle
for patent applicants and the PTAB may be the final hurdle to cross
before a patent application is issued.267 More often, however, the
PTAB will decide the end of a patent application’s life.268 Even if a
patent application makes it out of the Patent Office as an issued patent,
the PTAB still comes into play, “killing” these patents in post-grant
proceedings.269 It is difficult for applicants and patent owners to trust
an institution that has garnered this negative reputation.
Second, an institution that is particularly subject to capture by
special interest groups is unlikely to be given the trust and respect
necessary for that institution to easily make changes to the law. As
between the courts and the Patent Office, it may not be clear which
institution is most likely to be subject to capture. Without direct
evidence of capture, it is possible to infer capture based on tendencies
of an institution to rule in a particular direction. In order for these
tendencies to be dispositive evidence of capture, “one would have to
264. See Matthew Bultman, Fed. Circ. Pushing for More Clarity in PTAB Decisions,
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2017, 9:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/880041. In the
area of patent-eligible subject matter, some of the problem could be that rejections
are being appealed to the PTAB with scant reasoning from the examiner. See Robert
Plotkin, Software Patents are Only as Dead as Schrödinger’s Cat, IP WATCHDOG (Oct. 6,
2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/10/06/software-patents-are-only-as-deadas-schrodingers-cat (reporting Patent Office rejections, based on Alice, that provided
merely form paragraph reasoning).
265. Guidance at the Patent Office is specifically being given using references to
cases where patent eligibility was found or not found. See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., JULY 2018: ELIGIBILITY QUICK REFERENCE SHEET: IDENTIFYING ABSTRACT IDEAS 1
(2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-qrs_4.pdf.
266. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Hockett & DiLeo, supra note 108 (noting that the PTAB occasionally
finds patent-eligible subject matter, even where an examiner did not).
268. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 10, at 955 (noting the high “kill rate”
of patents during CBM review).
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assume that no fair-minded [institution] that had listened carefully to
all perspectives on the question of how best to promote innovation
could have reached an alternate conclusion.”270 Part of the problem
with this analysis, however, is which perspectives have actually been
considered by the institution in question. Some argue the Federal
Circuit is exposed to a disproportionate level of pro-patent
perspectives;271 yet, the court has regularly decided patent-eligible
subject matter cases against the patent holder. The Patent Office, on
the other hand, seems to have been indoctrinated with anti-patent
perspectives in the past decade. To succeed in fixing patent-eligible
subject matter, the institution entrusted with that task must have the
respect necessary from patent applicants and patent owners, among
other constituents; the Patent Office’s adoption of anti-patent
perspectives has harmed its reputation in this area.
One scholar argues the exact opposite point, namely that patenteligible subject matter decisions should be primarily entrusted to the
Patent Office due to the lack of trust and respect afforded the courts
as well as the Patent Office’s specific competencies.272 John Golden
points to the “federal judiciary’s historic struggles with subject-matter
issues” and Congress’s disinterest as reasons for lodging these
determinations in the Patent Office, as well as the Patent Office’s
purported expertise and incentives.273 “The malleability of technology
and of techniques of patent claim drafting mean that the policing of such
bounds requires not only continuous vigilance, but also continual
updating of guidelines for examiners and courts alike.”274 Courts cannot
do this for so many reasons, as described above. Congress on the other
hand is simply too slow, too uniformed, and too liable to special-interest
capture to be able to adequately address patent-eligible subject matter.275
However, Golden’s arguments were made prior to when the
Supreme Court increased the level of confusion surrounding patenteligible subject matter through the Alice opinion, and the behavior of
the courts and Patent Office in the time between Golden’s article and
now have not borne out his supposed bases. For example, Golden
indicates that it would be under “extreme circumstances” that the
Patent Office (or whomever is determining patent-eligible subject
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See Rai, supra note 212, at 1112.
See id. at 1114.
See Golden, supra note 200, at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1083.
See id. at 1091.
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matter) must determine whether additional steps are merely
“insignificant extra-solution activity.”276 Based on the way the patenteligible subject matter doctrine has played out, this is not an extreme
solution, but an everyday determination that must be made. Reality
has not lived up to Golden’s predictions, and thus his suggestion that
the Patent Office is the right institution for developing patent-eligible
subject matter falls a bit flat.
As a matter of institutional design, the courts are the best institution
to fix patent-eligible subject matter. The courts have the proper
competencies for the task at hand—essentially the development of a
common law of eligibility. Additionally, the courts’ priorities are better
aligned to create a cohesive and predictable doctrine. There is plenty
of redundancy in the system if patent-eligible subject matter is left to
the courts alone and, in fact, removing the extra layers of redundancy
caused by the multiple layers of potential decision points should also
improve patent-eligible subject matter law. Finally, as between the
courts and the Patent Office, the courts have a slight edge on the trust
and respect afforded them to be able to implement a better system.
B. Administrative Law
Although concepts of institutional design support vesting patenteligible subject matter decisions with the courts, rather than the Patent
Office, there is an additional argument against the Patent Office
determining subject matter eligibility. Specifically, as a matter of
administrative law, there has been no guidance provided to the Patent
Office regarding patent-eligible subject matter.
While the
nondelegation doctrine has significant limitations and has virtually
never been used to curtail agency action, § 101 includes so little
guidance to the agency that, should the nondelegation ever become a
viable argument, patent-eligible subject matter would be a prime
candidate for inquiry.
1.

Nondelegation doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine is based on the notion that legislative
power should be vested in the legislative branch and there are limits to
how much, if any, of this legislative power should be able to be ceded

276. Id. at 1061–63.
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to another branch of government.277 Despite appearing to be a useful
doctrine, the nondelegation doctrine does not have any real teeth;
Congress simply needs to have provided an “intelligible principle” to
guide the delegate’s exercise of power to pass constitutional muster.278
The Supreme Court struck down only two delegations under the
nondelegation doctrine, both in 1935.279 One of these delegations
“provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the
other . . . conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the
basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by
assuring ‘fair competition.’”280 Since then, challenged delegations
have withstood the inquiry about whether an intelligible principle has
been provided, even where the language is quite general.281 For
example, an intelligible principle has been found when Congress
required that agency authority not be “unduly or unnecessarily
complicate[d]”;282 that prices be fixed to be “generally fair and
equitable”;283 and that the action is in the “public interest.”284
Although the nondelegation doctrine is generally viewed as a nonstarter, modern administrative law scholars have shown how other
administrative law doctrines are achieving nondelegation goals by
forcing agencies to conform to political accountability, deliberation,
and fairness, as would be the case if Congress had not delegated.285
The problem is that it would be difficult to force the Patent Office to

277. LINDA TSANG & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44965, PRIVATIZATION
CONSTITUTION: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 6 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/cr
s/misc/R44965.pdf.
278. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(holding that “[i]f Congress [provides such an] intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power”).
279. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
280. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
281. See id. at 474–75.
282. See Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
283. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
284. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
285. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 223 (2001) (noting influence of nondelegation principles on doctrines
of administrative deference); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (arguing that
nondelegation concerns are behind other modern administrative law doctrines); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315–16 (2000) (substituting canons
of statutory construction to take the place of the unenforced nondelegation doctrine).
AND THE
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act deliberately and fairly under the current formulation of § 101
because it has absolutely no guidance upon which these attributes
could even be judged.
2.

An “intelligible principle” for patent-eligible subject matter?
The authorization for the patent system springs from Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, giving Congress the power to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”286 Thus, there is a direct
constitutional delegation to Congress to ensure that science and the
useful arts (that is, technology) are promoted. As discussed above, the
mandate is essentially to promote innovation. To achieve that
mandate, Congress has enacted a series of statutes, specifically the
Patent Act, including § 101.287 However, the only information, or
guidance, contained in that statute is that patents should cover
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, and the
inventions are subject to the other requirements of the Patent Act.
The inventions being rejected under § 101, however, are clearly
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. To the
extent the Patent Office is denying patents on processes, machines,
manufactures, or compositions of matter, it is clearly not following the
statute—and since the Patent Office (whether it be the examining corps
or the PTAB) does not assess whether science and the useful arts are
being promoted, or innovation is being encouraged, via its rejections, it
is also not fulfilling the Constitution’s goals for the patent system.
To be fair, there is value in delegating decisions of this type to the body
best equipped to handle them.288 However, for that to be true, there must
be a clear definition of the problem to be solved, and it must be
something that the legislature is ill-equipped to handle, while the agency
it has been delegated to is better equipped.289 While Congress may not
have the technological know-how necessary to determine what types of

286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
287. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.”).
288. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950 (1999)
(arguing that delegation is “a vehicle for good public policy”).
289. See id.
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inventions are eligible for patenting, it is not so clear that the question—
that is, promotion of innovation and the types of inventions that will
achieve that—has been sufficiently defined to delegate it to the agency.
Rather, notions of innovation do not seem to be part of § 101 of the Patent
Act, beyond that the invention be new and useful, requirements that are
covered more completely by other statutory provisions.
Other delegations to the Patent Office that encompass such widesweeping and important issues are much clearer in their charges.
Consider, for example, the Prioritization Authority granted to the
Patent Office in the America Invents Act of 2011.290 Specifically, the
delegation provides that the Patent Office “may, subject to any
conditions prescribed by the Director [of the Patent Office] and at the
request of the patent applicant, provide for prioritization of
examination of applications . . . that are important to the national
economy or national competitiveness without recovering the
aggregate extra cost of providing such prioritization.”291 While this
delegation calls for complex law and policy-based decisions to be
vested in the hands of the Patent Office, it provides substantive values
and direction on which these decisions turn, namely importance to the
national economy or competitiveness.292
Additional complex choices delegated to the Patent Office are more
substantive-procedural, such as those that direct the Patent Office to
promulgate rules and standards for post-grant review proceedings.293
This delegation too came with instructions; the Patent Office must
consider “the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the
integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the
Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.”294
With this level of detail as to the purpose of the delegation, it is easy to
290. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(G) (2012).
291. See id.
292. Congress did provide even more guidance about what sorts of technology it
anticipated being of importance to the national economy of competitiveness. The
original draft of the provision identified “green technologies designed to foster
renewable energy, clean energy, biofuels or bio-based products, agricultural
sustainability, environmental quality, energy conservation, or energy efficiency” as
exemplary technologies for prioritization. See 157 CONG. REC. S1052-01 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 2011). However, these examples were deleted prior to passage. See Sarah Tran,
Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498 (2012).
293. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (authorizing the Patent Office to develop
regulations “establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter”);
§ 316(d) (similar for post-grant review).
294. See id. § 316(b).
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determine whether the Patent Office is fulfilling its delegated role.
This is not true for patent-eligible subject matter.
Patent-eligible subject matter is, at this point, truly an open question
of law and policy—not a scientific or technical inquiry. To understand
that it is a legal point, and not science, driving these determinations,
one only needs to look at the reasoning provided by the courts and the
Patent Office in recent cases. Inventions are being deemed ineligible
for patenting because to patent such an invention “would preempt
downstream work” or because it “lacks something more,” both of which
arguably, although not necessarily, could be related to promoting
science and the useful arts.295 Yet other inventions instead are being
deemed ineligible because they are simply not desirable or because of
something unrelated to the innovative nature of the invention
altogether, like thwarting “patent trolls.”296 Thus, the decisions being
made about patent-eligible subject matter have very little to do with
promoting innovation, nor does the promotion of innovation even
seem to be part of the calculus. This could be because Congress has
not provided a sufficient delegation to give the Patent Office the
guidance it needs to develop patent-eligible subject matter.
While we generally defer to agencies on matters within that agency’s
wheelhouse, the open questions surrounding patent-eligible subject
matter have nothing to do with the Patent Office’s expertise. In fact,
the Patent Office has actually been called out for their lack of fitness
for law and policymaking.297 Specifically, scholars have pointed to the
Patent Office’s limited authority, lack of institutional competence, and
susceptibility to capture as being reasons why the Patent Office should
not be an arbiter of patent policy.298 Further, as discussed above, the
Patent Office’s primary area of unique expertise is technological.
295. See supra notes 55–56, 62 and accompanying text (discussing preemption and
“something more” in relation to the Alice decision).
296. See, e.g., David Newman, FinTech Sector at Risk from Attack on Patentable Subject
Matter, FINTECH WEEKLY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.fintechweekly.com/maga
zine/articles/fintech-sector-at-risk-from-attack-on-patentable-subject-matter (listing Alice
as an “over-reaching anti-troll” remedy).
297. See supra Section III.A.2.a for more discussion of this point.
298. See, e.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 168 (2009) (noting that the Patent Office has “virtually no policy
staff” and has experienced significant political pressure in the past when its leadership
has indicated a willingness to “take seriously the agency’s role in setting patent
policy”); Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76
MO. L. REV. 733, 755 (2011) (explaining that the Patent Office lacks institutional
competence and authority for policymaking).
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However, decisions about patent-eligible subject matter are not being
made based on technology at all. Even if the Patent Office knew the
criteria for developing this doctrine (which it does not), it may not
have the expertise necessary to do so.
Although Congress could amend § 101 to provide the Patent Office
with sufficient guidance to address patent-eligible subject matter, the
preceding section on institutional design explains why that option is
not likely to prove successful. Additionally, there are ancillary benefits
that may appear if we place the decision-making power over patenteligible subject matter solely with the courts.
C. Ancillary Benefits
In addition to situating patent-eligible subject matter decisions in a
better place, given their reliance on law and policy issues and
institutional expertise and given the lack of guidance to the Patent
Office provided by Congress, there are other potential benefits to taking
these decisions away from the Patent Office and placing them solely in
the purview of the courts. These benefits include: (1) fewer subject
matter challenges, (2) development of a more extensive jurisprudence,
and (3) true incentives for the courts to finally get these decisions right.
First, vesting patent-eligible subject matter decisions in the courts
will likely result in fewer subject matter challenges, which in turn would
be good for innovation for the reasons described above. Because it is
more expensive, in terms of both cost and resources, to bring a case to
court versus bringing an administrative proceeding before the Patent
Office, challenges to patent-eligible subject matter would be brought
less frequently and with more deliberation, rather than being every
infringer’s opening parry. It may seem inapposite that fewer cases
would allow for a better development of doctrine, but one of the issues
today is that it is nearly impossible to synthesize the sheer magnitude
of patentable subject matter decisions that exist. Reading through the
unruly mass of cases does not allow anyone to gather a reasonable
certainty as to what the law is. Limiting the institutions where subject
matter challenges can be brought will consolidate the decisions into a few
places (that is, the courts) where stare decisis matters and will hopefully
end up creating a coherent body of law. Thus, putting the courts in
charge of patent-eligible subject matter will improve both the
development of the doctrine and the effect of the doctrine on innovation.
Second, and relatedly, by vesting patent-eligible subject matter
decisions in the courts, there would (ideally) be a more complete
discussion of patentable subject matter jurisprudence from which to
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synthesize and understand the doctrine. Courts are held to a higher
standard of written reasoning than is the Patent Office due to rules of
civil procedure. If the decisions being made in patent-eligible subject
matter cases are more detailed, coupled with fewer decisions being
rendered under the doctrine, then there could quickly develop a more
coherent and clear jurisprudence about what exactly patent-eligible
subject matter is (or is not).
This benefit, however, would require some cooperation from the
courts. Some studies have shown that the Federal Circuit, for example,
has affirmed about 90% of patent-eligible subject matter decisions
from lower tribunals post-Alice.299 However, the Federal Circuit is not
helping to clarify the doctrine of patent-eligible subject matter. PostAlice, the Federal Circuit decided just over half of its patent-eligible
subject matter appeals using Rule 36 affirmances, meaning the court
says nothing at all.300 Most often, Rule 36 affirmances are used when
the Federal Circuit is reviewing a fact specific issue and the trier of fact
is entitled to deference, or else where the area of law is well-settled and
there is little to be gained from yet another opinion on the topic.301
These Rule 36 affirmances, however, do not help develop the doctrine
of patent-eligible subject matter. On the other hand, if the courts, and
especially the Federal Circuit, are unable to rely on the work of the
Patent Office, that is if the courts have to make legal determinations
(and fact findings as necessary) in the first instance for patent-eligible
subject matter inquiries, courts are more likely to deliver fully
explanatory opinions that also will allow for a more coherent
development of the doctrine.
Third, and in response to the objection that the courts convoluted
patent-eligible subject matter in the first place, removing the
determination from the Patent Office would force the courts to
(eventually) have to pony-up. Courts have fewer incentives to
crystallize the law of patent-eligible subject matter when it can always
be punted back to the Patent Office in post-grant proceedings. By
removing that option and forcing the courts to always handle the issue,
it would be in the best interests of the courts to provide a clear, easyto-apply rule to patent-eligible subject matter cases to keep these

299. See Gugliuzza & Lemley, supra note 68, at 793.
300. See id. at 802. The Federal Circuit decided 31.7 percent via precedential
opinion and 16.3 percent via nonprecedential opinion. See id.
301. See id. at 803.
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matters from clogging their dockets. Thus, the courts would have the
incentive to completely and clearly develop the doctrine.
D. Operationalizing the Proposed Solution
Admittedly, a proposal to take patent-eligible subject matter
decisions out of the Patent Office is radical, unpopular, and may not
seem likely. However, the Director of the Patent Office, Andrei Iancu,
made a number of remarks through Fall 2018 hinting at changes to
patent-eligible subject matter determinations at the Patent Office. On
January 7, 2019, the Patent Office issued the “2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance” document, implementing many
of Director Iancu’s remarks.302 The revised guidelines and the remarks
made prior to the publication of the guidelines dovetail nicely with the
above solution, as well as the pro-innovation goals described: (1) effective
and reliable patent rights, (2) commercialization of technology, and (3)
disclosure in the form of goods and patent documents. In fact, Director
Iancu specifically discussed innovation and how the Patent Office could
act to promote innovative activities. This section discusses some of
Director Iancu’s comments and how they may point the way towards
operationalizing the solution proposed in this Article.
On September 24, 2018, at the Intellectual Property Owners
Association Annual Meeting, Director Iancu discussed new guidance
as to how the Patent Office would be handling patent-eligible subject
matter determinations. In summary, Director Iancu stated:
. . . eligibility rejections are to be applied only to claims that recite
subject matter within the defined categories of judicial exceptions.
And even then, a rejection would only be applied if the claim does
not integrate the recited exception into a practical application.303

With this guidance, Director Iancu believes that this clarification
would “help drive more predictability back into the analysis while
remaining true to the case law that gave rise to these judicial

302. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Announces Revised Guidance for
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/us-patent-and-trademark-office-anno
unces-revised-guidance-determining-subject.
303. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Remarks delivered at
the Intellectual Property Owners Association 46th Annual Meeting (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-intellectualproperty-owners-46th-annual-meeting.
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exceptions in the first place.”304 Director Iancu’s remarks also
provided some guidance regarding the “abstract ideas” exception,
pointing to three categories: (1) mathematical concepts like formulas
and calculations, (2) methods of organizing human interactions, such
as fundamental economic practices, advertising, and sales activities,
and (3) mental processes, including forming an observation or
judgement.305 Additionally, the presence of one of the judiciallycreated exceptions would not give rise to the rejection; claims would
only be rejected if it is a mere principle. If the exception is practically
applied, it is not to be rejected. Most heartening is Director Iancu’s
acknowledgement that much of the rest of patent-eligible subject
matter inquiry has conflated other requirements of patentability into
this threshold analysis:
It is important to note that the first step of our analysis does not
include questions about ‘conventionality’ which are addressed in
Alice Step 2 . . . . This helps to ensure that there is a meaningful
dividing line between [§] 101 and 102/103 analysis . . . . [Similarly,
the] analysis also does not deny claims as ineligible merely because
they are broad or functionally-stated or result-oriented . . . . USPTO
examiners know, and will receive further guidance and training on,
how to apply well-defined Section 112 principles.306

In another speech, Director Iancu summarized his thoughts on
patent-eligible subject matter as follows:
Using Section 101, we just have to capture applications that would
otherwise pass muster under Sections 102, 103, and 112, but are on
things that we still should not patent. The Supreme Court has noted
some specific examples of what we should not patent. We must be
careful to not over-read the Court’s exclusions.307

Instead, as he concludes, the question ought to be whether the patent
claims are directed toward a defined building block of scientific or
technological work or toward a practical application of it.308 Director
Iancu has also regularly spoken to bar and industry groups, stating that
patent-eligible subject matter should be transparent, that people should

304. See id.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Remarks delivered at the
Intellectual Property Business Conference (June 11, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/aboutus/news-updates/remarks-director-andrei-iancu-ipbc-global-conference.
308. Id.
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be able to know what is eligible for patenting, and that the Patent Office
should not read the Supreme Court exclusions too broadly.309
These various remarks, and the revised guidelines implementing the
ideas raised by Director Iancu, go a long way toward operationalizing
the proposed solution above. First, by recognizing that a number of
non-patent-eligible subject matter doctrines have been grafted into the
§ 101 inquiry, and suggesting that those principles, like nonobviousness or enablement, be applied instead of patent-eligible
subject matter, Director Iancu is increasing the likelihood that patent
applications will be allowed to issue. This is because, unlike the
general case with patent-eligible subject matter decisions, applicants
regularly amend their claims to overcome other patentability
rejections. Applicants will be able to traverse these more aptly-framed
non-patent-eligible subject matter concerns, allowing patents to issue,
encouraging patentees to commercialize the technology, and
enhancing the amount of disclosure available. Second, Director
Iancu’s remarks focuses the inquiry of patent-eligible subject matter on
the technologies that truly raise concern—“basic tools of scientific and
technological work” like gravity or calculus or “pure mental processes
such as forming a judgment or observation.” Unless the claims actually
recite subject matter falling squarely within one of those categories,
the inquiry into patent-eligible subject matter is complete. That is,
unless the patent application claims gravity, or an elm tree—send it
through. The implementation of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance document has, in essence, implemented
the heart of the solution proposed above. Although the revised
guidelines have only been in force for a few months, the early results
seem to be positive—fewer patent applications are being rejected for
lack of patent-eligible subject matter.310
Just having the Patent Office allow more patents to issue, however,
is only part of the story. The doctrine surrounding patent-eligible
subject matter must still be fixed and, for the reasons laid out above,
fixed by the courts. One other reason in support of the proposal is
that any changes made at the Patent Office by Director Iancu could be
309. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Iancu: People Have a Right to Know What is Patent Eligible,
IP WATCHDOG (June 11, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/11/iancuright-know-patent-eligible.
310. See, e.g., Matthew Bultman, PTAB Taking Patent Eligibility Revamp to Heart, LAW360
(Feb. 15, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1130012/ptab-takingpatent-eligibility-revamp-to-heart (describing the revised guidelines and their effect on
the PTAB’s reversal rates of examiner determinations of ineligible subject matter).
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easily undone by the next Director to hold the office.311 Perhaps, in an
ideal world, Director Iancu’s remarks could form the basis of patenteligible subject matter doctrine going forward, but it is more realistic,
at this point, to view his role in the process as sending innovative
technology out of the Patent Office where it can benefit society and be
reviewed by the courts as needed.
CONCLUSION
Patent-eligible subject matter is a mess, and the state of the doctrine
is having a significant negative impact on innovation in this country. A
statute that is purposefully broad, to encompass all manners of
technological progress, has been mishandled by the Patent Office and
the courts such that it is actually hindering innovation. Fixing the mess
requires us to step back and ask what institution may be in the best
position to deal with the complicated law and policy issues that come
from the breadth of such a statute—and that is a question of
institutional design. Based on the competencies, priorities, redundancies,
and reputations of the various institutions who could be tasked with fixing
patent-eligible subject matter, the courts are the best answer.
Not only do courts make the most sense to answer the important
open questions about patent-eligible subject matter, but putting this
issue squarely before the courts will allow for additional benefits and
should promote, rather than hinder innovation. With fewer avenues
available for challenging subject matter eligibility, there should be
fewer challenges. This allows for more effective and reliable patent
rights, but also should permit the doctrine to develop more coherently
with less precedent to have to synthesize. Additionally, the courts
would have a greater incentive to develop a workable, predictable
doctrine if it was understood that the courts would be the institution
to regularly apply this doctrine. Again, this should enhance patent
rights. By allowing patents to more easily issue at the Patent Office,
because applications will not be rejected for lack of patent-eligible
subject matter, patent rights will be strengthened and, perhaps more
311. See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, Director Iancu Produces Glimmer of Patent Eligibility
Hope, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/directoriancu-produces-glimmer-of-patent-eligibility-hope.html (“The past 18 years have seen
Directors as varied as Rogan, Dudas, Kappos, Lee, and Iancu, each not just imposing
their own nuance to the Office but in almost every case changing the standards under
which patents were granted (and more recently, re-examined). This intrinsic
uncertainty makes it a certainty that for every Director Kappos or (perhaps) Iancu, we
will have a Director Dudas or Lee.”).
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importantly, companies will market products based on their
technology, which is good for society and innovation.
Take patent-eligible subject matter away from the Patent Office.
This is admittedly a radical solution. But as long as we are focused on
what words to add or subtract from the statute, rather than seeking
paths forward to encourage innovation, we are never going to fix this
mess. By looking at the institution who is best to move the ball forward
and understand the benefits this choice affords, we can change the
debate and may eventually see a way to promote innovation and
progress once again.

